Treenigheten - dens utrolige letthet i all sin kompleksitet

Denne posteringen ble til etter inspirasjon av Kjell Skartveits artikkel - Pinsen, da tre­enigheten bekreftes - på document 19. mai d. a.  

Jeg legger ut et par-tre tidligere artikler av Skartveit om samme eksistensielle tema under.

Når man nevner «treenigheten», skal man være forsiktig og trø varlig, for her ligger ikke bare Vestens forløsning, men også den virkelige og nærtakende mulighet for Vestens avløsning, dvs avvikling, hvis man ikke holder tunga rett i munnen.

Sier man «jeg tror på treenigheten», kan man nok forstå hva som menes, der og da.

Ser man imidlertid at Jesus nå sitter ved Guds høyre hånd i himmelen og er overbevist om at det er derfor Jesus ikke gjør mirakler her på jorden i dag, eller frir en ut fra en økonomisk ruin, men at det er bønn i Den hellige Ånd, og dessuten tale og bønn i tunger, helst, som frigjøre en og skaffer både penger og helse, vel, da er man jo ikke langt fra ikke å tror på Gud, i noen form, og hverken som Fader eller Allmektig, men kun som et uttrykk for egne plager, menneskefrykt og sentimentale håp, hvilke best kan og må pleies under «menighetens» blikk og i og med dens evige «inkassokrav». 

Men man skjønner like vel hva som menes, i all god tro, og som en slags forberedelse til en gang i fremtiden kunne skue Gud, det høyeste mål for alle, ifølge bl a Thomas Aquinas. Man lar trøstig alt dette fare. Bare der det er husrom og hjerterom, kan ordene seile sin egen sjø sammen med alle de loftige teoretiske eller unyttige teologiske krumspring, kledd i «bare» ord.

Litt anbefalt litteratur før vi går videre:

Systematisk teologi, Timmermann og Mjaaland: Verbum, 2017. Se Synd 8

The Trinity in a pluralistic age, Vanhoozer, 1997.

Delighting in the trinity, Michale Reeves, 2012.

Inkarnasjonen, Myte eller faktum?, Oskar Skarsaune, 1988.

Treenig Teologi, Svein Rise, 2017

The Logic of God Incarnate, Thomas V. Morris, 1986/2001

Simply Trinity, Mattew Barrett, 2021.

Theology and Sanity, Frank Sheed, 1993.

God, Peter Vardy and Julie Arliss, 2003, 2004, 2005.

The Domestication of Transcendence, How Modern Thinking about God Went Wrong, William C. Placher, 1996.

Trinity and Reality, Ralph A. Smith, 2004. Se om presupposisjonell teologi her, Bahnsen, verdisyn ...

A short history of Atheism, Gavin Hyman, 2020.

Theology in three dimensions, John M. Frame, 2017. 

When Jesus Became God, R. Rubenstein, 199.

The Holy Trinity, Robert Letham, 2004.

Inkarnasjonen, Bjarne Skard, 1951/1976.

Mange flere bøker og forfattere vil bli nevnt og kommentert underveis i denne posteringen.

Peter Vardy skriver: We can use the words: God is good, og dette betyr noe. En metafor utsier to helt ulike ideer kombinert og det foreligger intet krav om at det finnes et direkte forhold mellom dem. Hvis noen sier «Gud er min klippe», er ingen så toskete at de spør: Kalkstein eller granitt?

Paul Riceur hevder at det er det absurde ved den bokstavelige tolkningen som drar oppmerksomheten hen mot den nye meningen som metaforen formidler. s 53ff. (Med analogi er det noe annet … se denne som bl a omhandler Aquinas analogilære, Allah hu ackbar - virkelig?

og Når Gud diskuteres i visse redaksjoner ...

Fra Placher: «Et slikt tillitsforhold burde frigjøre kristne fra å tenke for mye på moralen. Luther foreslo, for at vi ikke skulle ta våre dygder altfor seriøst, at vi av og til utøvde vår kristne frihet på en lettere harmløs måte, som for eksempel å forsove seg, spise eller drikke litt mer enn normalt og delta i spøkefull omgang. Et tillitsforhold til Gud, mente han, kunne sammenlignes med et godt ekteskap. «Når en hustru og ektemannen virkelig elsker hverandre og har glede av hverandre, og virkelig tror på kjærligheten til hverandre, hvem skulle fortelle dem hvordan de skulle oppføre seg overfor hverandre …. ? De trenger ikke sjekklister for sømmelig adferd, ja, hvis de nå skulle følge slike instrukser, ville noe allerede være galt fatt i forholdet, men i stedet gjør de spontant mer enn det som nødvendig er, og fritt, med et gladt, fredfylt og tillitsfullt hjerte». (s 89 f William C. Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence).

Kristent tidsbilde:

In Christianity in Crisis, Hank Hanegraaff summarizes the theology of Kenneth Hagin (considered by many to be the father of this movement) as found in his booklet How to Write Your Own Ticket with God:

In the opening chapter, titled “Jesus Appears to Me,” Hagin claims that while he was “in the Spirit,” Jesus told him to get a pencil and a piece of paper.  He then instructed him to “write down: 1, 2, 3, 4.”  Jesus then allegedly told Hagin that “if anybody, anywhere, will take these four steps or put these four principles into operation, he will always receive whatever he wants from Me or from God the Father.”  That includes whatever you want financially.  The formula is simply: “Say it, Do it, Receive it, and Tell it.”

    Step number one is “Say it.” “Positive or negative, it is up to the individual.  According to what the individual says, that shall he receive.”

    Step number two is “Do it.”  “Your action defeats you or puts you over.  According to your action, you receive or you are kept from receiving.”

    Step number three is “Receive it.”  We are to plug into the “powerhouse of heaven.”  “Faith is the plug, praise God!  Just plug in.”

    Step number four is, “Tell it so others may believe.”  This final step might be considered the Faith movement’s outreach program.[2]

Kenneth Copeland states the faith formula this way: “All it takes is 1) seeing or visualizing whatever you need, whether physical or financial;  2)  staking your claim on Scripture; and 3)  speaking it into existence.” [3] 

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2024/02/ny-oversikt-stadig-ny-innsikt-islam.html

Og:

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2024/02/vil-du-ha-den-store-oversikten-som-kan.html

 

Veldig opplysende og åpenbaringslignende her. Diss lenkene kan med fordel åpnes etter å ha lest  den hovedbolken I denne posteringen som følger straks etter følgende bolk av lenker:

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2021/07/treenigheten-og-vare-dagers-totalitre.html

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2020/11/de-finale-arsaker-skapt-i-guds-bilde-og.html

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2021/06/den-nye-private-overguden-det-har.html

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2020/04/om-opphr-av-pisking-karen-armstrong.html

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2020/10/hvem-sier-du-at-jeg-er-et-lite-dykk-i.html

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2019/12/14-synden-og-synden-i-kristendom-og.html

 

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2019/07/4-syndene-og-synden-i-islam-og.html

 

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2019/04/treenigheten-nkkelen-til-vestens.html

 

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2019/06/synden-og-syndene-i-kristendommen-og.html

 

https://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2019/03/homo-oeconomicus-i-dagens-og-historisk.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2021/05/lei-av-lars-gule-vager-du-hviske-det.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2020/07/menneskeverd-og-natur-rett-pa.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2023/10/hva-er-det-med-visse-kristne.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2021/05/kan-de-korrekte-vinne-en-krig.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2023/02/hvithet-rasisme-mennsketyper-og.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2020/12/om-det-overnaturlige-i-det-naturlige-om.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2021/06/den-nye-private-overguden-det-har.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2021/07/treenigheten-og-vare-dagers-totalitre.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2019/04/forsker-elgvin-den-ene-eller-den-ene-av.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2021/10/nar-var-nre-fortid-blir-bare-mer-og-mer.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2021/03/mer-om-det-moderne-postmoderne.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2019/04/treenigheten-nkkelen-til-vestens.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2022/05/hat-ytringsfrihet-brenning-og.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2010/11/har-muslimer-plikt-til-hate.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2022/10/ny-underskelse-gammelt-nytt-om-det-som.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2023/12/den-som-har-rer-den-som-har-yne-en.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2019/12/vet-du-at-de-hater-deg-vet-du-at-du-br.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2023/06/selvdestruktiv-eufori-over-hele-europa.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2023/11/makt-bak-begrunnet-og-rettferdig-hap.html

 

http://neitilislam.blogspot.com/2024/04/frykt-og-redsel-for-endetid-og.html

Caveat:

Asbjørn Aarnes i «Wellhaven»: Gjennom kunsten kom hele livet ham i møte … det mest verdifulle dannelsesmiddel … ved fornuften hever mennesket seg over naturen … forblir trofast mot den menneskelige erfaring … det naturlige uttrykk er det høyeste produkt av kunst-streben … det dreier seg om en indre beskuelse … aldri gjøre den tekniske ferdighet til kriterium på diktning … diktet skal røpe det som ellers ikke kan nevnes med ord … en tryllemakt må være lagt i ordet … ordet får tryllemakt ved at tenkning og følelse inngår forbindelse … språkbruken må ta sikte på å røpe det som ikke kan nevnes: det ubegripelige … fortryllelsen går tapt ved uklarhet nå en dikters følelse eller stemningsliv ufrivillig reproduseres i verket … det vil da fremtres som noe som har hendt dikteren – analogt med drømmer og febersyner (mot Wergeland) … en indre beskuelse hvor målet ikke er å danne begreper, men å fremkalle og fastholde «sjeldne momenter av en høy indre klarhet … metaforiske betegnelser forn oe som (han) egentlig finner «uutsigelig» …

A H Winsnes i Welhaven, Metaphysik … 1965: … Kants lære om den moralske lov I vårt indre lar oss fatte det absoluttes idé i sin fullstendighet … den religiøse følelses varmere anskuende liv … den religiøse følelse som et avhengighetsforhold som metafysikken ikke formår å tyde … den lærde uvitenhet: docta ignorantia …

Og så til selve oppgaven:

Justin martyr: Vi ser Logos avsluttet og fullstendig i Jesus Kristus, et vesen (personae) forskjellig fra Faderen, men avledet fra Ham ved Han fylde og nærhet (intimacy), som når en flamme fra en fakkel tenner en annen fakkel, (s 143 i Diarmaid Mac Culloch).

Logos er en annen enn Gud som skapte alle ting, (s 145).

Monarkistiske modeller av Gud: Jesu Kristi natur var blitt adoptert av Gud som sønn og Faderens makt hvilte i Jesus Kristus menneskelige natur, (de brukte homoousious som fremdeles brukes i Niceum).

Theodotus: JK er menneske som alle andre bortsett fra at han var født av en jomfru, men Jesus ble ikke Gud.

Modalistene: Faderen, Sønnen og Den hellige ånd er kun aspekter av samme guddom som åpenbarer seg i eller under ulike masker (personae), som rolleinnehavere på et teaterscene.

Modalistisk monarkisme er sabellianisme.

Origines ville sikre Jesu frie vilje slik at han ikke skulle spille den rollen som doketistene ville han skulle spille. Alle vil bli frelst fordi alt kommer fra Gud.

Hvordan kunne en rettferdig og god Gud «hardne» Faraos hjerte? Origines bruker analogien om voksen og leiren: Solen bruker på en og samme måte, fra en og samme kilde, sin varme både til å mykne voks og tørke leire. Luis Markos s 148.

Descartes: Når voksen føres nær til flammen, forandrer den sin fysiske form slik at sansene ikke kan oppfatte den på samme måte som før. Like vel forblir voksen den samme som før. Hvorfor? Jo, fordi voksens natur på ingen måter «åpenbares» for min imaginasjon, men blir persipert (oppfattet) utelukkende av mitt sinn … persepsjonen er hverken en visjon eller en berøring eller en imaginasjon;

persepsjonen beror utelukkende på hva som finnes i det mentale (purely mental scrutiny), ib s 194.

Arius om JK: Det var en tid han ikke var (s 213).

Athanasius: Likheten mellom Faderen og Sønnen er som «synet i to øyne», (s 216).

Appolinarius: Beholdt «homoousius», men Jesus hadde ikke hatt et menneskelig sinn, men at den guddommelige logos ganske enkelt hadde «assumed flesh», (s 220).

Alexandrinere så Antiokenerne som blasfemiske når disse sa at JK var sann gud og sant menneske (samtidig). Derfor: Alexandrianerene: Gud og mennesket inneholdt i en person kan lignes med et beger som er fylt av vin og vann og derfor blandet. Antiokianerne: Innholdet er en blanding av vann og olje, altså ikke blandet, men adskilt i begeret, dvs to naturer, (s 223).

Antiokianerne brukte «theotokos», motsatt Nestorius, som sa at dette er bare tull, han ble fordømt i 431. (s 228). De mente at Ordet er skaper av tiden, ikke skapt i tid.

Skarsaune: Sabellius: Sønnen er «vesens-ett» med Faderen, s 62. Ignatius bekjemper slike som sier at Kristus bare tilsynelatende led og døde, slik doketistene påsto, (sml islam).

Filiouque: (s 320 i Culloch): Augustin: minne, forståelse (forstand?), pluss vilje er En men ikke tre substanser.

Skard, s 28: Doketistene forkynner en legemsløs frelser, Sam 29. 5. Ordet Gud brukes om Kristus 10-15 ganger. Ignasius-brevene. Teleisantropos = virkelig menneske. s 37: Foren oss med deg som vintreet med sine grener, s 39: «ortodox» betød først «rett lovprising», ikke rett lære. s 42: sannhetskanon=trosregelen. s 54: Modalisme: Det går an å bekjenne troen og likevel slippe forbi det klare Ja til Herrens manndom. Forbigående teofani. Faderen har forvandlet seg til Sønnen. Den menneskevordnede forsvinner etter gjort gjerninger i sin metafysiske bakgrunn fra som strålen inn i solen. Sabellius: Den evige energi som er alle ting bakgrunn har i historiens løp suksessivt opptrådt som Fader, Sønn og Hellig ånd, en himmels rolleserie, Guds mot oss vendte ansikt. Åpenbaringen har nærmest bare streifet kjødets verden og oppløses igjen som en skyformasjon på de «evige energiers himmel».

Adoptianismen: Nøytraliserer Kristi guddom. Kristus er nedenfra, katothen. Kristus arbeider seg oppover. Intet himmelsk vesen er kommer. En gradvis inntredende divinitet.

s 57: Skard: I hellenismen er logos et av de store lærdomsord som tidlig er trengt ut i de brede lag og betyr omtrent hva man kunne kalle en mer eller mindre personifisert kosmologisk «idé». Logos er alle tings «fornuft» eller «prinsipp». Logos gir tilværelsesinnholdet mening og lys (was dei Welt im Innersten zusammenhælt). Ordet sto i filosofiske bøker og det var på alles lepper omtrent som senere tider har talt om «utvikling» e l, og dermed hatt følelsen av å få bedre tak på tingene. Etter sin opprinnelse har ordet ikke noe med kristendom å gjøre.

s 10: Hvordan forstå at Ordet (sermon), ble kjød? spør modalistene. Praxeus: Forvandling, transfiguratio in carne?

Tertullian: Guds uforanderlighet (er det nødvendig å tro at). Den modalistiske inkarnasjonen krever en forhenværende guddom. Kristus som da opphører å være Gud uten å bli menneske. Det som forvandles til noe, slutter å være det det var. Tertullian: Ravet som etter tidens oppfatning var en mixtura av gull og sølv, men samtidig hverken det ene eller det andre. Kristus er ifølge Skriften ikke delvis det ene og delvis det andre. Overalt, til enhver tid Guds Sønn og Menneskesønnen. K’s substanser bevares i deres egenart og hverken transfigurasjon eller adopsjon. (Det er nok at det står skrevet), se under her.

Origines, s 254, s 62 ff: I Skriften er Ordet blitt kjød for alltid å være blant oss=monarkismens nederlag i Øst. Gud er lyset og Logos velder frem av lyset. Som lyset aldri kan være uten sine stråler og sin glans, kan heller ikke Faderen og Sønnen tenkes uten hverandre. Men vi kjenner Gud alltid bare som den enbårne sønns Fader. Sønnens vesen er en evig vorden av Gud.

Hippolytos, Novatian, 250, Kristus-Logos er av Guds substans; var han bare et menneske, hvordan kunne han da si at den som tror på ham, skal ha evig liv? Begge deler er i Kristus forbundet, begge sammenføyet til ett.

s 60: Ansikt til ansikt med problemet om transfiguratio carnem viser det seg at Tertullian, i dialog med Praxeas, slår ned på tanken om Guds foranderlighet. Her ser han åpenbart sakens kjerne, « det er nødvendig å tro at Gud er uomskiftelig og uforanderlig likeså vel som han er evig». Den evige Gud forandres ikke og samme grunnsetning gjelder dermed også det guddommelige Ord, som likeså etter Skriften «står fast til evig tid», Jes 40. 8. Skal nå Joh 1. 14 ikke desto mindre presses i den retning (bli kjød=transfigureres til kjød) blir følgen at det overhodet ikke fremkommer noe virkelig menneskevesen. Det kan i høyden blir tale om et vesen som tidligere har vært Logos, qui Sermo fuit. Den modalistiske inkarnasjon skaffer verden en forhenværende guddom, hva der i alle tilfeller er noe annet en det Johannes vil si med ordet kjød. Kristi menneskevesener oppgitt til fordel for en slags simulasjon. Dette er hovedsaken for Tertullian overfor Praxeas. På den annen side er han klar over at transfigurasjons-forestillingen også ødelegger den guddom som på sett og vis var modalismens hjerteanliggende. «Det som forvandles til noe, slutter å være det det var, og begynner å bli noe det ikke var». Resultatet blir en Kristus som opphører å være menneske uten å oppnå å bli menneske! Inkarnasjonen er filosofert i stykker.

Det latinske substansia svarer noenlunde til det greske fysis, «natur», (henholdsvis guddommelig natur=guddom og menneskelig natur=manndom, eller til det mer abstrakte usia, «vesen». Tanken er nærmest at den at nettopp fordi Kristus er Guds Sønn «av natur», er inkarnasjonen nådesbeviset uten like idet han frivillig hengir seg i offeret.

«De er alle tre Én, en enhet i substans; vi beholder imidlertid mysteriet idet vi via fordelingen fra Enhet til Trinitet plasserer dem i suksesjonen Faderen, Sønnen og Den hellige Ånd. De er tre, ikke i tilstand, men i grad; ikke hva gjelder substans, men i form; ikke med hensyn til autoritet, men i hvordan de fremtrer; og alt dette fra en substans og i en tilstand (and of one state), og fra en makt, idet Han er Én Gud, fra hvem disse gradene, formene og fremtredelsesmåtene blir forstått, under navnet Faderen, Sønnen og Den Hellige Ånd» (Hill s 34).

Appolinaris, d 375. Kristus er vitterlig blitt menneske, men problemet er egentlig hvor lite en kan slippe unna fra det med. Skriften kaller Kristus det himmelske menneske, noe som ikke taler til fordel for en «vesentlig» manndom. Kristus kom i menneskets skikkelse. Han ble funnet som et menneske, 1 Kor 15, 45 ff, Fil 2. 7, Rom 8. 3. Den logospsykologiserende fase. Hvor står et at K hadde en menneskelig ånd? K er bare et besjelet menneskelegeme! Aristoteles hadde sagt at «to fullkomne ikke kan være ett», og når kirken har satt seg utover dette, har den gjort inkarnasjonen til et tankekors!

Skard:

s 76: Kunne en kalle den doketiske Kristus det illusoriske menneske, og den modalistiske Kristus det foreløpige menneske, så kan en kalle den apollonianske frelser et kvasi-menneske. I dette menneske er «åndens» plass evakuert til fordel for den himmelske gjest, dvs guddom og manndom er skjøvet inn i hverandre, «blandet», slik at hele vekten blir liggende på den første. Alt lyder slagordet: Bare én natur har den inkarnerte logosguddom! Monfysitismen melder sin ankomst! En pågående agitasjon forplanter seg fra menighet til menighet over hele Østen.

s 85: Skard siterer historikeren Paul Elmer More: «Mellom det faste punkt å anta Kristi fulle guddom og det faste punkt å betrakte ham som blott og bart menneske, mellom det overrasjonale punkt på den ene side og det rasjonalistiske punkt på den andre, finnes det bare ikke ingen fast grunn å stå på, men like sikkert som en mener seg å ha funnet en slik mellomstasjon hvor fornuft og tro kan forlikes, like sikkert vil fornuften smått om senn ta makten, inntil det ikke er annet tilbake av den opprinnelige tro enn den pure humanitarianisme. Vi kan protestere mot dette alternativet – og storparten av arianerne gjorde det i oldtiden, som «liberale teologer» gjør det i dag – men historien viser at det er uomgjengelig. For en generasjon som så dramatisk hadde opplevd nettopp dette alternativet, fremstår Nicenum i det gjenerobredes gland, og etter å ha vært gjennomdrøftet og gjennomkritisert som neppe noe annet aktsykke har vært det, opplever det sin seiersdag på konsilet i 381, som gir det uforandrede symbol sin stadfestelse, og etter beste forståelse i den opprinnelige ening av houmousin.

Arianisme: filosofisk monoteisme. Gud er utilnærmelig, i abstraksjonens stratosfære, den absolutte eksistens hvis vesen er uskapthet og som ikke har noen sønn, men som likevel kan tenkes representert med en mellommann, jfr islam.. Her settes logosbegrepet inn for den som vil berøve K ære , jfr islam. K er ktisma, en skapning. Hans fødselsstund er hans skapelsesstund. Det var en tid han ikke var. Men K er likevel ikke kun et menneske, han er et ideal og har høy moral. Han er forbilde, men hverken gud eller menneske!! Kan, riktig nok, være Gud for mennesket, men ikke Gud i seg selv.

Apollonaris: K er et halvmenneske. Arius: Jesus er et slags halvmenneske=adoptianisme.

Nicenum nevner ikke Logos, s 81. Arianerne snakket aldri om JK som sann Gud. De ble derfor nødt for å hevde at bønn til Kristus er en utlbørlighet! (Virgil: Redsel omkring meg, og skremmende ro, s 91). Fornuften er monist, (Skard). Person (proposon) ville monofysittene nødig bruke, men brukte hypostase i stedet for. I inkarnasjonen har JK gjennomtrengt sin menneskenatur med sitt himmelske vesen – som ilden som gjennomsyrer jernet. Jfr Apollonaris’ påstand om «den ene natur». JK blir ensbetydende med «allmennmenneskelighet», et fargeløst stoff som er ferdig til å absorberes i guddommen. Her fins intet Ecce Homo. K forsvinner inn i sin himmel.

Nestorianismen: JK «savner» menneskelighet, er deres lidenskap. Frelseren er en av oss? Skrifttroskap – persona duplex. En rent etisk kontakt mellom JH to personer, men likevel benektes ikke hans guddom! JK har oppnådd sitt navn gjennom sin karakterutvikling! K bor i Jesus som et tempel, s 98. Guddom og manndom side om side som to sammenlimte trefjeler, som to forskjellige personer.

Kalkedon, 451, s 99: Personenheten er som lyset som ikke skal erstattes med sine komplementærfarger, (Skard). Ordet bor ikke i Jesus som gjesten i sitt herberge!, s 100. Kalkedon er doktrine, ingen definisjon, ingen metafysisk tenkning! Skard s 106: Ikke tenkningens «absolutte vesen», hvis evighet er som en endeløs polarnatt. Men åpenbaringens Gud, som en fylde av liv.

Letham s 432 – guds to hender uten hjelpere til skapelsen … ? s 429/420 – demokrati!! s 410 – bare Gud kan navnsette seg selv!! (jfr Geisler om navnet Allah!).

Skarsaune s 115: Tertullian: Det er Sønnen, ikke Faderen som ble inkarnert, led og døde. Bare den menneskelige natur i JK som led og døde. s 116: Origines: Gud Logos forholder seg til Gud som lysets utstråling forholder seg til lyset. Evig fødsel. Logos er en egen «hypostase» i Gud.

Paulus av Samosata, ca 260, Logos er en upersonlig kraft som kan ta bolig i et menneske som i et tempel. I mennesket Jesus bodde Guds upersonlige Logos-kraft. Gud er fri for lidelse og død. Subjektet for lidelse og død er blott og bart menneske.

Alexiandrinerne eliminerte hele inkarnasjonstanken. Logos tok ikke bolig i et menneske, han ble et menneske. Logos antok et menneskelig kjød og ble involvert i lidelse og død.

Arius: Logos kan i streng forstand være guddommelig siden han hadde del i sult, lidelse og død, men Logos må høre skapningen til. (For å utelukke arianernes formuleringer, tok man i bruk ikkebibelske termer: Født av Faderen vil si: Av Faderens vesen … av samme vesen. Keiseren ville senere få Arius gjenopptatt i kirkens fellesskap!

Athanasius, s 320, biskop i Alexandria: JK har lidd alle menneskers død og frelste alle sine brødre inn i oppstandelsen, han er sann Gud og sant menneske.

Appolloniarus: Logos i Kristus tok den menneskelige fornufts plass. Det JK ikke har antatt som sitt, kan han heller ikke frelse, slik Origines hadde hevdet, pluss kappodicierne.

Nestorius: : Født av Maria. K som Logos etter guddommelig natur. Maria er Kristus-fødersken. Kyrill mener at dette er en fornektelse av hele inkarnasjonens realitet; det er ett handlende og lidende menneske i JK, (en natur).

I Antiokia talte man om to naturer. Chalkedon: De to naturer er uten sammenblanding og uforvandlet.

Hill, s 35: Ånden er den tredje fra Gud OG Sønnen, slik som frukten er den tredje fra treet og treets rot eller som bekken ut fra elven er den tredje fra kilden. Treenigheten forstyrrer eller forringer ikke Monarkiet! Subordianisme. s 500: Origines: Gud er ikke infinitt! Derfor feil å be til JK. s 65: Arius motsier Athanasius so sier det er Guds natur å føde Sønnen, i en evig fødsel, (eternal begotten). s 11 ff: Palamas, d 1359. Rundt 1330 kommer Barlam til Konstantinopel og hevdet at ulikheten mellom Øst- og Vestkirken angående treenigheten er irrelevant, siden ingen kan ha sikker kunnskap om Gud!

Palamas: Gud er ikke bare en gud som transcenderer «beeings» - tingene i sin oppdelte helhet, vil jeg si – men Gud er noe mer enn Gud; storheten til den som overskrider, er ikke bare høyere enn alle faktiske beskrivelser, men også «høyere» enn de «de negative beskrivelser», jfr via negativa, det overskrider all storhet man kan tenke seg. Men ganske enkelt å si, som Barlam, at Gud ikke kan kjennes eller at vi ikke kan vite noe om Guds essens, eller «fullkomment» eller uttømmende beskrive Ham, vil jeg si, er ikke akseptabelt, det er ikke akseptabel relativisme. Vi kjenner Gud gjennom JK, men hvordan? jo, gjennom å skille mellom Guds essens og hans energeia. Men er ikke dette å forutsette en halvgud? Palamas sier: Gud handler med oss. Han opprettholder at DHÅ utgår fra Faderen alene, ikke også ut fra JK. Men vi kan erfare Ånden som kommende både fra Faderen og Sønnen. Vi kjenner Gud fullt ut, men ikke av egen anstrengelse, bare via Hans handling med oss.

Hill s 87: Poenget med nåden, for Augustin, er ikke at den tvinger oss, men at den får oss til å ønske å gjøre hva som er rett og ikke synde. Gud forvandler vår vilje og setter oss i stand til å gjøre det som er rett, (? – peccare non posse … ), nesten som om viljen samarbeider ed Gud når den gjør gode gjerninger, som Hill sier det.

Athanasius kaller Faderen «opprinnelsen», (arche), til Sønnen, «fødende Sønnen». Sønnen er homoousios med Faderen, men han sier aldri at Faderen er homoousios med Sønnen! Faderen er kilden, Sønnen er bekken; Faderen er lysets kilde og Sønnen strålen; ( s 145 i Letham).

Gregor av Nyssa påsto at treenighetens individuelle komponenter var like «virkelige» som enheten mellom dem, men han sammenlignet også Jesu menneskelighet med hans guddommelighet med å bemerke at den menneskelige delen var som en dråpe eddik i havet, (s 208 i Rubenstein).

Athanatius: Hva betyr det når man sier at to entiteter har lik essens? Å si kun at noe er lignende på noe annet, etablerer ingen fundamental likhet mellom dem. Men å si at to ting er like med hensyn til essensen, betyr at de deler en felles natur. En fordomsfull romer kan komme til å si at goterne ligner på romerne uten å mene at de tilhører samme arten, (species), men goterne ER like i essens med romerne, fordi de er mennesker. Testen er reproduksjonen: hvis en entitet kan avledes fra en annen, så må de dele en felles natur. På samme måte sier vi at tinn bare ligner på sølv, en ulv på en hund, og forgylt bronse til bronsen selv. Men tinn er ikke avledet av sølv og ulven kan ikke regnes for et avkom av hunden, (s 198 i Rubenstein).

dr Nathan Wood: «Ettersom den verden vi lever i, er Guds verk, så er det nærliggende at denne verden også avspeiler Guds vesen. Når Gud er Én og har åpenbart seg i en trefoldig skikkelse, må vi kunne finne noe lignende i hans skaperverk og det lar seg vise. La oss begynne med tiden. Det er kun én tid. Ingen fikk den ideen at det er tale om 2 tider, men denne tiden kjenner vi som fortiden, nåtiden og fremtiden. Hver gang vi tenker på den og taler om den, skjer dette i denne tredelingen.

Til tiden hører så rommet. Det fins kun étt rom og ingen kan tenke seg et annet et ved siden av og likevel beskriver vi og beregner dette rommet med hjelp av tre dimensjoner. Ingen av de tro dimensjonene er selvstendige, alle tre tilhører rommet, alle tre må være der for at rommet kan være der.

Eller hvis vi tenker på menneskene, så er hvert menneske et i seg selv innelukket, selvstendig vesen, og likevel lærer Bibelen oss at mennesket er ånd, sjel og legeme. Legemet alene er ikke mennesket og ånden alen så absolutt ikke et menneske. DE, sammen med sjelen, er like nødvendige. De danner til sammen et menneske.

Som det siste nevnes materien. Vi finner den i tre tilstander: Fast, flytende og luftformet. Som det best kjente eksempelet, kan vi nevne vannet som forekommer som is, væske og vanndamp. Kun étt stoff altså, men i tydelig forskjellige former. (Fra Bibelen og moderne vitenskap, Henry Morris, 1956, Ref s 58 i Baar).

«Også vi er enige i at Gud har skapt alt ved Ordet og Fornuften og Kraften. Dets innerste vesen er Ånden, i hvem Ordet er når det taler, Fornuften når den ordner og Kraften når den handler. Vi lærer at kommer fra Gud og er født av Ham. Derfor kalles Han Guds Sønn og er forenet med Guds vesen; også Gud er jo ånd.

Som strålen utgår fra solen, er den en del av det hele, og solen selv er samtidig i strålen fordi strålen tilhører solen. Substansen bli ikke delt, men utvidet. Som lys tennes av lys, utgår ånd fra ånds og Gud fra Gud. Den opprinnelige substans forblir hel og ubeskåret selv om det kommer flere stråler ut av den. Slik er det også med den som er utgått fra Gud – Gud og Guds Sønn – og begge er én. Såldes er ånd av ånd og Gud av Gud forskjellige bare med hensyn til mål – i orden, men ikke i vesen. Den har ikke fjernet seg fra sin opprinnelige kilde, men er utgått fra den, slik det var profetert om, har altså denne stråle av Gud senket seg ned i en jomfru» (I Tertullian: Forsvarsskrift for de kristne, s 92, 2012, Dagfinn Stærk).

«Augustin forsøkte å finne sporene av treenigheten i den menneskelige sjelen. Menneskeånden blir seg Gud bevisst, memoria, kjenner ham, intellectus, og elsker ham, amor.

En virkelig gudsåpenbaring må være trinitarisk, og ikke bare et delbudskap om Gud. Et spor av dette kan man finne i kunsten, og særlig i musikken. Man kan hente fram i minnet en tilfeldig stor komposisjon … f eks c-moll-messen av Mozart og se den i lys av brever han skrev om hvordan han komponerte den.

1 Messen lå fra begynnelsen av gjemt i Mozarts sjel eller ånd. Der lå den bevart som en spire, som ingen mennesker kunne få øye på.

2 For at mennesket skulle få del i den, måtte messen ble skrevet ut av Mozarts sjel og ned på partituret. Gjennom partituret fikk menneskene tilgang til messen. Slik kan vi si at messen har to naturer: den natur den hadde i Mozarts sjel eller sinn fra begynnelsen av, og den natur den har hos musikerne, som kan forstå messen ut fra partituret.

3 Men med dette er ikke messen ennå vekket til live. Den må klinge ut. Men når den blir spilt, oppstår to muligheter. Én tilhører kan forkaste den som noe forferdelig bråk, mens en annen vil kunne bli grepet i dypet av sin sjel av dens skjønnhet. Det siste kan bare skje når det er kongenialitet mellom messen i Mozarts sjel, messen i partituret og messen i tilhørerens sinn. Gjennom en slik kongenialitet kan messens ånd gjenoppstå i tilhørerens sinn.

Messen i c-moll får på denne måten tre uttrykk, som en spire i Mozarts sjel, som er nedtegnet i et partitur og som tilhørerens opplevelse, ikke i tre ulike messer, men bare i én messe. Mozart komponerte den i sitt sin, men messen blir ikke nedgradert eller forringet; den messen som er nedskrevet eller blir fremført, har samme verdi og samme kvalitet som messen i Mozarts sinn og er uten noen form for reduksjon den samme messen.  Og denne psykologiske kjensgjerning kan tjene som en sammenligning når man vil prøve å fatte betydningen og nødvendigheten av treenigheten. s 92 ff Kristne og muslimer, Johan Bouman, Oslo 2002, Luther Forlag.

«En dyp lengsel gjennomsyrer mennesket hjerte. Vi lengter etter uegennytte, en evig kjærlighet vi kan ha absolutt tillit til, vi lengter etter samhold og fellesskap, virkemidler som kan bringe oss tilfredshet og som kan gagne oss og gi oss fred. Vi lengter etter samforstand og samtale, etter å få snakke med noen og bli snakket til. Vi lengter ett relasjoner og tilhørighet til noe som er større enn oss selv. Vi lengter etter ydmykhet og lykke, både for oss selv og andre. Vi lengter etter fred og harmoni og at lidelse, utnytting og manipulasjon opphører. V lengter etter et uegennyttig felles gode.

Hvorfor? Fra hvor utgår disse lengslene?  De ligger der alle som en design vi kan spore tilbake til Den trinitariske Gud, men heller enn å finne tilfredshet i Gud, blir lengsler til lyst, men likevel kommer vi aldri til å slutte med å lengte, og dette er fordi vi er skapt i Guds bilde for å kunne reflektere Hans hellighet, selv om den synden vi bærer på forvrenger refleksjonen av Den treenige Gud.

Treenigheten er det første samfunn og samtidig idealet for alle samfunn. Samfunnet selv er ikke blitt tilsølt av syndens tilsøling og snever egenkjærlighet. Flersidigheten i Gud som Far, Sønn og Hellig Ånd er en perfekt enhet, et ubrytelig samhold som kommuniserer seg selv på en tillitvekkende og sann måte og som elsker uforbeholdent, lever i tilknytning – ikke isolasjon – tjener ydmykt, samhandler i fred. Enkelt sagt: Treenigheten er på alle måter det ideelle samfunn, idealsamfunnet. Eller for å si det på en annen måte: Gud er en venn som har venner». ( Fritt etter Doctrine av Mark Driscoll & Gerry Breshears, Crossway, 2012).

Religionen i krise 2, s 215, Johannes Sløk:

Den mest sjokkerende måte hos Cusanus, på 1400-tallet, er hans måte å behandle det overleverte treenighetsdogmet på, for så vidt han identifiserer den indre trinitariske utvikling eller spenning

med skapelsens ytre ontologiske prosess. At Gud nødvendigvis er treenig, kan utvikles logisk. Gud er den som alltid og uavkortet er identisk med seg selv. Ved å fremsette denne påstanden har man spaltet gudsbegrepet opp i en dualisme, nemlig mellom Gud og «seg selv», men ved «identisk med» er dualismen igjen opphevet, «seg selv» er føt tilbake til Gud, hvilket betyr at setningen «Gud er identisk med seg selv» er treenighetens formel i logisk kledning.

Wayne Grudem illustrer «treenighetens ontologi», som jeg vil kalle det, med en tennisball! Ballen har en omkrets som omslutter Faderen, Sønnen og Den hellige Ånd, men tennisballen er inndelt i tre soner hvor det går en grense mellom dem som gjør seg uttrykk i en liten nedsenkning i ballens stoff, noe som ikke avgrenser ballens egenskap som nettopp en tennisball. Hvis Faderen, F, er hele sirkelen, så er også Sønnen, S, hele sirkelen og det er også Den hellige Ånd, DhÅ. Grudem skriver: Hvis Gud ikke er treenig, ville forsoningen, rettferdighetsgjørelsen ved tro, tilbedelse av Kristus, Gud som kilden til våre frelse, den frie og personlige Guds natur og selve basisen for universets enhetlighet være tapt i sin helhet.

Et velkjent bilde på treenigheten er sammenligningen med «vannets ontologi»: Is er ikke vann, vann er ikke damp, damp er ikke is. Denne analogien har midlertid sin begrensning, forteller Douglas A. Jacoby, s 79: Faderen er ikke en storknet utgave av Sønnen, heller ikke er Ånden en mer eterisk utgave av de andre «størrelsene». En bedre illustrasjon kan være relasjonen mellom vår bevissthet eller vårt sinn, våre ideer og våre ord. Disse tre utgjør en enhet, men har ingen radikalt lik identitet. Tertullian foreslo bilder som rot, tre og frukt, sol, solstråle og sollys, kilde, elv og strøm.

En svært aktuell tilnærming til treenigheten: Hein Heisen: Måske udspringer Vestens kulturelle styrke fra treenighedsdogmet. Det betyder, at sandheden ikke er en fast grund. Men relationer mellem de største forskelligheder. Forholdet mellem den ene Gud og de tre: Faderen, Sønnen og Ånden, bliver aldrig afgjort.

Og er det heller ikke i Bibelen. Heraf kommer en dialogisk læsning. Det betyder, at en tekst siger noget om mit liv og mit liv siger noget om teksten. Og ud af bevægelserne i treenighedsdogmet tænker Hegel, Marx og Freud bevægelserne videre. Kun den første vedkender sig mig bekendt arven fra treenigheden. Kristen fundamentalisme er en selvmodsigelse. Som jødedom og islam er kristendommen en bogreligion, en åbenbaringsreligion. Men i kristendommen afgør den enkelte selv, hvad der står i teksten. Det var det Luther kaldte: »Det almindelige præstedømme«. Bibelkritik har en tradition på 5oo år. Korankritik findes ikke.

Den franske antropolog Claude Lévi Strauss, som ikke kan beskyldes for fremmedhad, skriver i bogen 'Tropisk Elegi', at muslimer erstatter virkeligheden med en bog, jo mere de læser i Koranen jo mere er de tapt for denne verden.

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Ukjent kilde:  «Jeg sitter her med en vidunderlig bok av (klassisk lutherske) Martin Chemnitz, «De to naturene i Kristus» (fra 1578, - min engelskspråklige versjon er utgitt 1971), og han henviser til hvordan «de fleste av de gamle/the ancients» tolket Fil 2,6-9, og likeså Ambrosius, Erasmus og Luther tenkte; de tenkte på at hele guddomsfylden bodde/bor legemlig i Kristus (Kol 2,9). «Slik som jern ved sin forening med ild sies å være i ilden», er menneskenaturen forenet med guddomsnaturen i personen Jesus: «Han var i Guds skikkelse». Men han så det ikke som et «rov» å være Gud lik».

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Unity school of Christianity:

Den hellige treenigheten, skrev Fillmore, er kjent som Faderen, Sønnen og Den hellige ånd. Metafysisk forstår vi treenigheten slik at den refererer til sinn (mind), idé, og uttrykk eller tenker, tanke og handling. Christian Science sier: Liv, sannhet og kjærlighet. H.J. Berrry kommenterer: Unity lærer en tro på en upersonlig gud, tro sitt panteistiske grunnlag. De tror ikke på Gud som en person som har et intellekt, emosjoner og vilje. Han er bare et prinsipp, for dem. Gud er ikke en person som har liv, intelligens, kjærlighet og makt. Gud er på en måte bare «livet» selv. Gud er ikke en person som elsker, men kjærligheten selv. Det er sant som det står i Joh 4. 8 at Gud er kjærlighet men det er ikke sant at dette kan snus dithen at «kjærlighet er Gud», slik Unity gjør. De refererer riktig nok til Gud som om han skulle være en person, men de tror ikke at han er det. De tror i stedet monistisk, eller på monismen, at når alt kommer til alt, så er alt av samme essens. Gud er et prinsipp, ikke en person. (Fra Trust Twisters av H J Berry).

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Legg merke til hvordan vi er Sønn av Gud; ved å eie det samme vesen som Sønnen har. Hvordan kan det ha seg? Eller hvordan vet vi hvordan vi er Sønn av Gud, siden Gud ikke kan lignes med noe? For det er visselig sant. Det er som Jesaja 40. 18 sier: Med hva kan du sammenligne med Ham, eller hvilket bilde kan du gi Ham? Og siden det er Guds natur ikke å ligne noen, så tvinges vi til å slutte at vi ikke er noe, slik at vi kan bli ført inn i den identiske væren som Han er i seg selv.

Når dette er oppnådd, når jeg slutter å overføre meg selv inn i bilder overhodet og når ikke noe bilde i meg lenger er i meg, og når jeg driver ut av meg selv alt som er i meg, da er jeg klar til å bli transportert inn i Guds nakne væren og Åndens rene væren. All likhet må utstøtes fra det. Og så blir jeg oversatt inn i Gud og jeg blir ett med Ham – en enkel substans, ett vesen og en natur: Guds Sønn. Og når så dette er oppnådd, er ingenting lenger skjult i Gud som ikke er blitt nedfelt i meg eller ikke er meg. Da blir jeg vis og mektig. Jeg blir alle ting, slik Han er, og jeg er ett og det samme vesen som Han. (Eckhart ca 1326, oversatt fra Rubenstein, Aristotle’s Children, s 267). ...

Gitt de underliggende forutsetningen i gresk filosofi – nødvendigheten av og legitimiteten til det enkelte menneskes autonome tenkning – kan problemet «Den ene og de mange» ikke løses via fornuften.

For: Hvis den Ene er «det endelige» eller absolutte, så har diversiteten eller mangfoldet i tilværelsen ingen egentlig mening, i høyden bare en sekundær, tilfeldig, relativ eller midlertidig mening. Den første greske filosofen, som mange vil kalle ham, sa: Alle ting «kommer ut av» eller flyter fra og vender tilbake til den Ene. Mening kan ikke tilskrives noe radikalt annet og ha noen eksistens annet enn i og gjennom den Ene. Virkelig, vedvarende og ultimat mening tilhører den Ene, hvori i alt «oppløses». Parmenides, som hevdet det Enes primat, overlater oss til et mysterium og en uforståelig Ene og et meningsløst «de mange».

Større hjelp i dette vil vi heller ikke finne i Heraklit, som hevdet det motsatte av Parmenides. Hvis vi nemlig postulerer «de mange» som det ultimatum som grunnlag for å finne mening, ender vi opp i det samme grunnproblemet som Parmenides grundet på. Mening i egentlig forstand blir umulig nettopp fordi det ikke finnes noen radikal eller absolutt «sammenheng» eller noen enhetlig grunn for alle ting. Alt eksisterer isolert fra alt. I Heraklits tankeverden er hver enkelt av de mange selv det ultimate prinsipp og enhver relasjon mellom to av de mange vil forutsette en enhet over dem, som binder dem sammen (og som gjør kommunikasjon via språk eller prinsipper). Dette oppløser da de manges ultimatum. Forklaring og mening blir dermed umulig, radikalt sett.

Men er dette så viktig da? Er ikke dette bar spekulativt vås og helt unyttig for våre formål politiske og kulturelle formål i dag?

Vel, både Hitler og Stalin hevdet meninger og avslørte holdninger som satte statens tarv over individets interesser, Hitler med sin nasjonale sosialisme og Stalin med sin internasjonale kommunisme. Begge var imidlertid totalitære kollektivister, dette til tross for at den ene av plasseres på høyresiden og den andre på venstresiden i det politiske landskapet. Begge anså den Ene som ultimatum.

I kontrast til dette truer kaos og anarki: Hvis de mange blir det eneråden premiss for tenkning og politikk, vil hvert menneske bli sin egen lov og den ultimate autoritet. Familien, staten, kirken og andre grupper vil da, ironisk nok, ikke kunne begrunne sitt egenverd og sin fundamentale betydning. Politisk vil fragmentering ta prioritet over samling og alt forbli oppsplittet i endeløse selvtotaliserende enklaver, som hver for seg ikke finner noen balanse eller kreativ harmoni mellom den Ene og de mange. Det sier seg selv at dette innbyr til evig strid og voldelige konflikter den en etter den andre uten fred – virkelig fred -  i sikte og dessuten uten noe sant håp om å kunne etablere sannhet i en dypere mening av ordet, både individuelt og kollektiv. I ikke-kristen filosofi øker sannsynligheten for at man hverken finner noen løsning på grunnleggende metafysiske dilemmaer og begrunnede forklaringer på moralske, vitenskapelige og rasjonelle prinsipper man tross alt må leve med, på ett eller annet vis, med eller uten halve eller hele sannheter.

Bibelen og den judeokristne tro og tradisjonen gir på sin side heller ingen systematisk «løsning» på problemet med den Ene og de mange som et abstrakt filosofisk prosjekt, men troen gir dem likevel mulighet for å takle problemet i det daglige livet, i troen. Dogmet om treenigheten er et slikt hjelpende konsept som får tingene, omskiftelighetene og problemene til å henge sammen på en meningsfull og helthetlig måte, selv om dette dogmet i seg selv kan betraktes som i seg selv uforståelig for fornuften alene, det kommer an på hva man tillater seg selv å åpne seg for og la seg påvirke av. Treenighet innbyr ikke ensidig til mystisisme, men til en større, holistisk og en personlig tilnærming og forståelse av og for «dimensjonene», for å si det slik.

Kristentroen presenterer selve dilemmaet som «personlig» og løsningen er Gud selv og fordi han er En, så er han absolutt enhet, både i seg selv og i sitt skaperverk. Men den judeokristne Gud er også Tre, dvs flerfasettert, flerpersonlig eller personmangfoldig, om man vil, prima facie.  Flerfold og mangfold får dermed sin ultimate betydning i Gud selv, både i hans natur og i og med hans essens, et «faktum» og et absolutt fundament vi bare kan ta for «face value» ved tro, i både hvilende ro og aktiv, skapende fred. Treenigheten er en u-utømmelig kilde til tankeklarhet, men også en påminnelse om tankens eller fornuftens radikalt utømmelige begrensning. Hvis vi lar oss åpne for treenighetens universelle paradigme, vil den påvirke oss radikalt og være dannende for vårt menneskesyn, vår virkelighetsoppfatning og vårt verdisyn og dermed som en mer eller mindre aktiv eller passiv, implisitte eller eksplisitte personlige bidragsyter – med sin egen dynamikk og egen agens – til våre valg både på det individuelle og kollektive planet, både intrapersonlig så vel som interpersonlig. Den vil kunne styre våre holdninger, våre handlinger, våre følelser, refleksjoner og vår fornuft, ja, vår erkjennelse, vår kreativitet og intelligens, vå innlevelsesevne, vår empati og forstand, både overfor oss selv og andre mot selve senteret i den kristne tro: Jesus Kristus, Jeshua, Messias og det kommende gudsriket.

Treenigheten funksjon er med andre ord å gjøre oss til autentiske, ydmyke personer i selvrealisasjon overfor Gud, ikke i servilitet og platt opportunisme overfor mennesker, som vi bare så altfor åpenbart har en tendens til å frykte mer en Gud. (Etter inspirasjon fra Ralph A. Smith).

Mer: Om den ene og de mange, Aristoteles, Mekka-Medina, Sokrates, Heraklit, Parmenides ... 

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Hva mennesker tro om Gud, påvirker både deres privatliv og de land de bor i. Konsekvensene av hvilken gudstro folk har, kan bli avgjørende for alle aspekter av folks liv og levnet, deres velferd og lykke eller mangel på sådan.

Kan ulike oppfatninger av hva treenigheten er og hva den innebærer påvirke ulike samfunn i radikal forstad? Kan dogmer og dogmetolkninger avgjøre et samfunns funksjonalitet? Kan treenigheten så å si diktere hvilken type samfunn som utvikler seg innenfor interessesfæren av de ulike tolkninger av nettopp treenigheten?

De fleste i dag vil nok avvise en påstand om at selve treenigheten er avgjørende for hvorvidt samfunnet blir mer eller mindre demokratisk eller mer eller mindre hierarkis, autoritært eller diktatorisk og/eller statisk.

For femten hundre ord siden kom det til en splittelse i kristenheten da øst- og vest valgte ulike måter å formulere og forholde seg til treenighetslæren. Denne splittelsen har gjort seg gjelden helt opp til denne dag. Konflikten sprang primært ut fra ulke syn på det man har kalt «hierarkiet innen treenigheten». Østkirken – den ortodokse kirke -  hevdet at Sønnen og Den hellige Ånd sto i et underordningsforhold til Faderen. Vestkirken – Romerkirken – hevdet motsatt, nemlig at treenigheten bygget på forutsetningen at hver enkelt person er likeverdige, eller av essens like, udelelig og helt uten forskjell, hverken ontologisk eller i forhold til rang. De tre personene her er kontinuerlig underlagt hverandre i kjærlighet. Dette åpnet den vestlige kristendomsforståelse for at guddommen under absolutt likeverdighet impliserer både enhet og mangfoldighet.

I østkirken kunne oppfatningen av treenigheten føre til at en modell for kreativ frihet og blanding av krefter, så å si, kunne bli nedtonet og bortfokusert, i bredere samfunnsmessige relasjoner. Man så ikke treenighetens indre dynamikk, med det gjensidige underordningsforhold den forutsetter læremessig i den vestlige dogmatikk. De østlige landene fikk ikke noen reformasjon med innføring av et såkalt «allment prestedømme», slik lutherdommen forfekter, og praktiserer, så langt det går, og de fordeler denne oppfatningen kan utløse i form av sosiale, politiske og økonomiske fortrinn og forbedringer. Oppfatningen at det fantes et indre, absolutt hierarki i guddommen gjenspeilet seg i den samfunnsdannelse man forsøkte å etablere, og som imiterte hierarkiet i guddommen, i alt fra konkrete familieforhold til overbyggende statsdannelse. Gudsoppfattelsen vi har – og tilføres oss via ulike tolkninger av dogmene - setter med andre ord et eksempel å etterligne. (Cunningham s 119 ff).

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Robinson siterer Letham: For å avslutte for denne gang med noen betraktninger av Mike A. Robinson:

”A unitarian god does not possess the eternal diversity in his nature to account for the diverse and neccessary laws (the Law of non-contradiction distinct from the Law of Identity, and the particulars in the cosmos (people and things).

Islamic theology cannot account for nor explain the problem of unity in diversity (the one and the many). Letham opines that Islam is a ”militant and monolithic unifying principle, with no provision for diversity”. A uni-personal being lacks the capasity to account for eternal and temporal particulars”.

”Let me ask you a question: if God is just a monad, a singel person God, where did love come from? Who did Allah love before he created the angels or men? Love needs an objekt … ”

”The Muslim cannot account for logic, love, absolute morals and knowledge”.

”Allah is described as wholly and completely incomparable, transcending and beyond all things, as there is nothing that is analogous about him. Correspondingly, he then cannot be anything, and he is nothing, and cannot exist by definition”.

”If Allah is the only eternal being, and nothing exist that is analogous to him, nothing can share anything in common with him in his beeing and attributes; hence an eternal book in Paradise cannot exist”.

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Kjell Skartveit: doc

Mennesket har alltid hatt en religiøs følelse når det så opp mot stjernehimmelen, under bålet. Grekerne kalte det kosmos, smykke.

Grekerne gav oss filosofien, kjærligheten til kunnskap, politikken og skjønnheten. Jødene gav oss Jahve og Loven.

Outsider: Kristus kommer inn som en outsider og slår alle kategorier over ende, både jødenes og romernes: Det du søker finnes ikke her, det er et annet sted. Mitt rike er av en annen verden. Lignelsene overlever: Jesus henvender seg direkte til det enkelte menneske og rører ved deres hjerter. Bildet av kvinnen ved brønnen, av den bortkomne sønn, av Lasarus er slik at de som har hørt dem aldri glemmer dem. Da vi var små tegnet vi dem på skolen. Det gjør de nok ikke lenger. Jesu historie er blitt farlig. Det er blitt en anstøtssten. Men nettopp derfor vokser hans betydning.

Noe av det mest sentrale i Jesu budskap er ordene om at «verdens fyrste allerede har tapt». Vi er borgere av to verdener: Oppdragelse og dannelse betyr å gi barna en følelse av at det er noe mer, noe ut over det immanente, noe transcendent. Kristus er navet i det transcendente, fordi han henvender seg direkte til hvert enkelt menneske.

Avvisningen: Hvor sterkt dette angår oss ser vi i den aktive avvisningen av Kristus den dag i dag. Det er som om han står der i skyggene med tornekronen. Vi forsøker å ignorere ham, men han er der, like brysom. Fordi han er menneske som oss, fordi han volder oss besvær. Den sentrale personen i vår historie er en outcast som ble dømt for blasfemi og hengt på korset som en annen forbryter, ja, sammen med to kriminelle.

Uventet: Han dukker opp på de mest uventede steder. Leif Gjerstad hadde en interessant artikkel om en ny doktorgrad i forskning.no:

    Postdoktor Ole Jakob Filtvedt ved Det teologiske menighetsfakultetet bringer inn som en mulig forklaring hvordan kristne og muslimer har forholdt seg til tradisjonen om Jesu korsfestelse. Han peker på at det at Jesus måtte bære korset på vei opp mot Golgata, og der spikres fast for å dø, kan tolkes som en krenkelse av Gud – hvis man antar at Jesus var Guds sønn.

    Samtidig er denne hendelsen en så integrert og sentral del av kristendom at det muligens kan gjøre det enklere for kristne å forholde seg til krenkelse av sin gud og sin tro.

    Og når islam benekter at korsfestelsen fant sted, fratar det dermed kanskje også muslimer de mulige positive tolkningene av en krenkelse og ydmykelse av sin profet og gud?

    – Jeg kjenner ikke islam innenfra, men det slår meg som spesielt ved den kristne troen at Gud lider et slikt skamfullt nederlag – i hvert fall tilsynelatende. Det er en spenning som man jobber mye med i Det nye testamentet: Hvordan kunne det skje at Jesus ble korsfestet? Fordi man i antikken var opptatt av skam og ære, og oppfattet det  som en stor skam å dø på korset, har kristne helt fra det første århundret jaktet på en positiv forståelse av det inntrufne, sier Filtvedt.  Han mener dette kan ha betydning for hvordan kristne forholder seg til krenkelse.

    – Som kristen deler jeg erfaringen av å skulle forholde seg til det hellige, og ønsket om at dette skal møtes med respekt. Jeg ønsker ikke at min tro skal krenkes og jeg er ikke immun mot å bli såret. Men at Gud har gjort seg sårbar for krenkelser, avvisning og latterliggjøring, betyr at det har gjort det lettere for meg å forholde meg til latterliggjøring.

Slik slås kategoriene om det hellige og det profane over ende: Jesus kullkaster dem. Han er guden som blir ydmyket og spottet og endelig drept. Dette gjør noe fundamentalt med vår oppfattelse av det guddommelige, for heller ikke grekerne kjente en slik gud. Relevansen for synet på ytringsfrihet er innlysende: Den som berøres av Kristus forstår at en ting ikke trenger å være det den utgir seg for. Blasfemi trenger ikke være krenkelse, eller: kanskje krenkelsen er på sin plass. Kanskje det handler om noe helt annet? Kanskje det høye skal bli det lave, og omvendt? Dette var og er revolusjonerende tanker.

Politikken: Kjell Skartveit påpeker i sin nye bok Gud og Staten, hvordan Treenigheten inspirerte puritanerne i USA politisk:

    Deres mål var å skape politiske ordninger der makten ikke kunne misbrukes, og løsningen ble en tredeling av makten, som en politisk skygge av Treenigheten. For makt korrumperer, enten man er kristen eller ei.

En slik relevans kommer som en total overraskelse på dagens avkristnede europeere. Når de mister kontakten med kristendommen mister de også kontakten med sin egen historie og politiske røtter.

Skartveit: «En av de viktigste teoretikerne ideen om maktfordelingsprinsippet er franskmannen Montesquieu (1689-1755). …. Om kristendommen sier han at den disponerer for en moderat styreform»:

  Den kristne religion står fjernt fra den rene despotisme; det skyldes at den mildhet som så sterkt formanes i evangeliet, står i motsetning til det despotiske raseri med hvilket fyrsten tar seg til rette og utøver sine grusomheter.

Denne mildhet er ikke basert på snillisme, på vammelhet og feighet. Det er den mildheten som kommer av å kjenne mennesket i dets svakhet, i dets synd.

Dessverre har protestantismen slik den ble praktisert i Norge skapt en forestilling om synd har med bestemte handlinger å gjøre, om muligheten for renhet og spesielt da alt som har med sex å gjøre. Dette har fremmedgjort mange fra det kristne budskap.  Etterhvert som permissiveness er blitt samfunnets norm fremstår kristendommen som irrelevant. 

En slik oppfatning av synd er en svært overfladisk lesning av kristendommen. Synd har med menneskets grunnvilkår å gjøre. Det er vår human condition. Sivilisasjon er en måte å håndtere synd på, å sublimere den, slik Freud fant ut. Men ikke utrydde den. For å transformere mennesket må det bli født på ny. Dette er svært vondt. Det rører ved en eksistensiell smerte hos mennesket, som i stedet stod og så på at han ble slått ihjel.

Dermed har vi for alltid knyttet ham til oss, og kan ikke bli kvitt Ham. Han er blitt det sterkeste symbolet vi kjenner. Korset. 

https://www.document.no/2015/04/03/anstotsstenen/

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Hva har det å si for mennesket at guddommen er treenig eller én?

En treenig Gud, der alle i treenigheten er like i makt og ære, viser oss en Gud der begrepene relasjon og forskjellighet er sentrale størrelser. Gud er en relasjon, men allikevel ett. En treenig Gud, med Faderen, Sønnen og Den Hellige Ånd, er en forutsetning for begrepet kjærlighet, for kjærlighet står ikke alene, kjærlighet er en relasjon mellom noen, den kan ikke eksistere uten. Tenk deg at guddommen er alene i verden, det er bare en til stede. Han er alene, uten noe av det skapte. Alt det vi kjenner til eksisterer ikke. Det finnes ingen levende, ingen han kan forholde seg til. Vil denne guddommen da vite hva kjærlighet er? Vil han vite hva kjærlighet er dersom han aldri har vært i relasjon til andre enn seg selv? 

Kjærlighet kan ikke eksistere for seg selv, den vil alltid forutsette flere. Og dette er den viktigste forskjellen på kristendommen og andre religioner. Gud er ikke statisk, men en stadig aktivitet, der enheten mellom Far og Sønn er så reell at den også er en person.  

Kommentar: Få plasser kommer dette så godt til uttrykk som i Johannes 3.16:

«For så høyt har Gud elsket verden, at han ga sin sønn den eneste, for at hver den som tror på ham, ikke skal gå fortapt, men ha evig liv». (Ps: Noen dyktige og kjente teologer mener at «då høyt» er dårlig oversatt og mener, slik en del bibelutgaver sier, at det heller burde stå: «På denne måten elsket … « osv.

… Det eneste som kan forklare vår opplevelse av kjærlighet, er derfor den relasjonen Gud har hatt til sin sønn gjennom alle tider, en kjærlighet som viser seg igjen i skaperverket, der Guds kjærlighet kommer til uttrykk. Guds hensikt med skaperverket er å få en relasjon mellom seg og det skapte, en relasjon som gjenspeiler treenigheten, og det er det C.S Lewis (Se det i øynene) mener med at mennesket blir ikke mindre med å bli en kristen, men mer, det blir mer av seg selv.

Det gir derfor mening å si at Gud skapte for å gi kjærligheten videre, at Guds natur fører til en skapning der relasjoner er en logisk konsekvens, og der kjærligheten kan dyrkes og foredles, for en treenig Gud skaper av kjærlighet, for kjærligheten er, som sagt, relasjonelt betinget.

En ting er at treenigheten er en forutsetning for kjærlighet, noe annet er at den også er en betingelse for sorg, for kjærlighetens konsekvens er sorg og smerte, jo mer du elsker, jo mer smerte må du tåle med et eventuelt tap av den du elsker. I kristendommen har vi derfor en lidende Gud, en Gud som i smerte over menneskets fall tilbyr seg å gå i deres sted som et uskyldig offer. Som Gud brydde seg for oss, skal vi bry oss om vår neste.

Julens budskap fortsetter naturlig inn i påsken. I påsken ble vi vitne til den ultimate kjærlighetserklæringen. Og derfor utspiller det seg også et politisk drama på Langfredag da Jesus Kristus ble henrettet på et kors. Husk at vi her snakker om universets skaper, Guds egen sønn. Han lar seg bli hånet og krenket i en grad verden verken før eller senere har sett maken til. For det første er han uskyldig. Han har ikke gjort noe galt. For det andre kan han når som helst unngå fornedrelsen, og for det tredje gjennomgår han straffen for å frelse dem som påfører ham smerte. Det er for sine egne mordere han lider. Og da må vi stille spørsmålet: Hvilke konsekvenser får det for hans etterfølgere at deres herre og mester lot seg gjennomgå den ultimate krenkelse?

Guds forskjellighet og ønske om en relasjon til det han skapte, legger grunnlaget for et samfunn med dyp respekt for menneskelivet og det mangfoldige. Det forklarer kjønnsrelasjoner og nasjonaliteter, det frigjør for ulike kulturelle uttrykk, dog alltid basert på en forutsetning om at det ikke skal undertrykke enkeltindividets integritet. Det skaper et samfunn som har både fellesskapet og enkeltindividet i sentrum. Som Faderen Sønnen og Den Hellige Ånd er selvstendige, men uløselig knyttet til hverandre, er også mennesket uløselige knyttet til hverandre i ulike fellesskap, men det er fellesskap som etter Guds vilje skal forstå og respektere den enkelte.

En av konsekvensene av Langfredag, er forståelsen av krenkelse. Som sagt ble verden vitne til Gud selv lot seg krenke uten å ta til motmæle. Tvert imot lot han seg ydmyke, men ikke bare ydmyke, han tok på seg en tjeners skikkelse og viste oss et ideal for lederskap og etterfølgelse. Ydmykelsen viste oss at ingen skal kunne påberope seg krenkelse som grunnlag for reaksjon mot andre mennesker.

En annen viktig side med Langfredag, er at Jesus døde for alle, ikke bare for en nasjonalitet, klasse eller kjønn. Ingen kan si at de har mer rett på frelseren enn andre, og få vers i bibelen har betydd mer enn Galaterne 3.28: «Her er ikke jøde eller greker, her er ikke slave eller fri, her er ikke mann eller kvinne, for dere er alle ett i Kristus Jesus».

Et tredje forhold med langfredag er friheten som en Guds gave til mennesket. Gud tvinger ingen. Gud er ikke en despot som søker menneskenes underkastelse, det er menneskers frie valg Gud ønsker, og han gir dem frihet til å velge. Gud lar menneske få velge ham bort, dette er ikke underkastelse, og kristne er da forpliktet til å gi sine medmennesker den samme friheten.

Det er ikke uten grunn at demokratiet, som oppstod i antikkens Hellas, har funnet sin form i den kristne kulturtradisjon. Kristne lærde så at den naturlige konsekvens av det kristne budskapet var demokrati og menneskerettigheter. Det var imidlertid ikke bare politiske konsekvenser knyttet til det kristen tro. At også kapitalismen, hvor frihet og sannhet er grunnsteinen, vokste frem i den kristne kulturkrets blir en selvfølgelighet. Sosiologen Max Webers analyse av den protestantiske arbeidsmoral er forbilledlig, men den bør ikke overraske noen.

Islams rene monoteisme vil alltid stå som en motpol til kristendommens treenighet. Svein Tindberg hevder at det ikke ville blitt noen dialog av å kåre en vinner av islam og kristendommen. Burde vi ikke bruke 2013 til å gjøre politikere og andre oppmerksomme på treenighetens konsekvenser, og dermed også skape forståelse for at den rene monoteismens konsekvens ikke er noe annet et underkastelse og vold? Hva skal vi med dialog dersom den ikke er bygget på realiteter og sannhet?

Sann kjærlighet finner vi kun hos den treenige Gud. I julen møter vi den hos et lite barn, et barn som forklarer hele vår eksistens. Barnet viser Guds ønske med oss alle. Alt annet blir slaveri og et verdirelativt kaos. Godt nytt år!

https://www.document.no/2012/12/31/julens-politiske-drama/

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Julens budskap, politisk aktuelt i 2013?, Av: Kjell Skartveit   24. desember 2013, 09:45

I en tid hvor begreper som toleranse, pluralisme og livssynsnøytralitet er blitt de nye honnørordene og samfunnets grunnmur, kan det være på sin plass å stille et avgjørende spørsmål; Kan et samfunn overleve uten et felles verdigrunnlag, en felles tro? 

Stadig flere tar til orde for at samfunnets økende religiøse mangfold må få konsekvenser for hvordan vi vurderer de ulike religionene innbyggerne har. Det er for det første blitt vanskelig å hevde at en religion skal ha forrang fremfor andre, og for det andre har kunnskapsnivået om den kristne tro sunket i takt med kravet om økt toleranse og forståelse for andre religioner. De settes alle i samme bås, og sjelden så vi det tydeligere enn under kors-debatten i NRK.

Journalist Sven Egil Omdal skrev i Stavanger Aftenblad 9. november at «Hadde Siv Kristen Sællmann vært muslim, ville det ikke vært vanskelig å samle 108.000 stemmer på at hun måtte fjerne alle tegn på sin identitet. Det er helt sant, kors på halsen.» som en reaksjon på at mange kristne engasjerte kristne ønsket å tillate programledere i NRK å bruke kors som smykker.

Spørsmålet er ikke til å komme utenom; er islam og kristendom to sider av samme sak? Er det irrelevant hvilken religion samfunnet vårt henter ideene våre fra, eller trenger vi i det hele tatt en felles tro? Kan det være at Omdal ikke ser hvorfor det blir så sterke reaksjoner på korsnektelsen? 

Den franske politiske teoretikeren, Alexis de Tocqueville, skrev etter sitt besøk i USA i 1832 at:

    «Det er lett å se at et samfunn ikke kan trives hvis dets borgere ikke har en felles tro å samles om, ja, det vil ikke engang kunne eksistere. For uten et felles idégrunnlag blir det ikke noe samvirke, og finnes det ikke samvirke, finnes det kanskje fremdeles mennesker, men ikke noe samfunn. For at man kan tale om et samfunn, og for at dette samfunnet skal trives, må alle borgerne alltid kunne samles om visse grunnleggende ideer, og dette er umulig hvis ikke den enkelte iblant henter sine meninger fra en felles kilde og godtar atskillige ferdige oppfatninger.» 

Siden middelalderen har Norge vært et samfunn der kristendommen har definert menneskets verdi og samtidig vist oss hvem Gud er, det har vært den sannheten vi har hatt som utgangspunkt for lovgivning og nasjonsbygging. Men dette synet er under sterkt press, eller for å si det enkelt, vi blitt likegyldige til religionens betydning, og dermed er alt blitt like gyldig.

Men kristendommens budskap handler ikke om likegyldighet, det handler om Gud selv som ble menneske, og det for å kunne invitere oss til en evig kjærlighetsrelasjon til seg selv. Vi kan si at hensikten med skaperverket blir åpenbart i julens budskap, det er Skaperen selv som kommer med en redningsaksjon for å frelse det som er skapt i hans bilde, og som han elsker så høyt at han var villig til selv å gjennomgå den ultimate krenkelse for å redde det. Dette budskapet førte til en ny forståelse av begrepet menneskeverd, det ble vår felles kilde og sannhet. Det er den diametrale motsetning til islams budskap, og den kristne verden har derfor helt frem til vår tid bekjempet islams lære.

Men ikke nå lenger, nå er det verdipluralismen som skal bære fellesskapet, og samfunnet blir i prinsippet ateistisk, religionen privatiseres. Men hvilket resultat gir det?

Forfatter og professor i litteratur, C. S. Lewis, var en av de som var tydeligst i møte med dem som hevdet at man kan bygge et samfunn på ateismen, og han skriver om naturalistene at: «Når de skriver at vi «må skape en bedre verden», husker de da at ordene «må» og «bedre» ifølge deres egne påstander, henviser til irrasjonelt bestemte impulser som verken kan være sanne eller uriktige, like lite som oppkast eller en gjesp kan være det?» C.S. Lewis kritiserer dem for å fastholde en filosofi som utelukker humanitet, men allikevel forblir humane, og peker blant annet på deres krav om at vi alle skal handle slik at våre etterkommere ikke lider under våre handlinger. Men hvorfor skal vi det, dersom det ikke ligger en moralsk vurdering til grunn? Og han fortsetter; «Naturalistene kan ikke knuse all min respekt for samvittigheten på mandag og forvente at jeg skal bøye meg for den igjen på tirsdag.»

C.S.Lewis tok også opp kampen mot dem som hevdet at Jesus Kristus var en stor morallærer, men ikke noe mer enn det. Og han er skarp når han påpeker inkonsekvensen i hyllesten av Jesus som et moralsk forbilde. Vi må enten akseptere Jesus Kristus som Guds Sønn, eller forkaste hele historien. Men forkaster vi historien om Jesus som Guds Sønn, blir ideen om hans morallære umulig å holde fast på, for da forsvinner det faste punktet Han snakket ut fra; Gud selv, og uten treenighet, er det ingen kjærlig relasjon tilbake. Det er dette NRK utfordrer med sin korsnektelse, det er en aktiv handling i kampen mot over 1000 år med en felles sannhet om ondskapen og kjærligheten.

Vårt samfunn er bygget på troen på Treenigheten, en tro som har ført til resultater vi i dag synes å ta for gitt. Det er blitt dårlig latin å hevde at hva vi tror på former samfunnet, eller hevde at ulike religioner gir ulikt resultat. For Tocqueville var det en umulighet, Hans svar var entydig; et samfunn må bygge på noe samlende, noe som limer folket til hverandre og loven. Men vi er i ferd med å forkaste denne forståelsen av et samfunn. I vår multikulturelle tid skal vi ikke ha noen sannhet, alle religioner og livssyn forutsettes å leve fredelig side om side. Men problemet er at det ikke er mulig, all historie bekrefter det. Og det er ikke bare religionsdebatten som avslører det, også abort- og homofilidebatten viser at et samfunn ikke kan være verdimessig i strid med seg selv. 

Det er på tide å drøfte hva konsekvensene blir når julens budskap ikke lenger skal være samfunnets grunnmur. Slik sett handler striden om korssmykket om mye mer enn et smykke, den handler om hvem vi egentlig er, og i en slik diskusjon er englenes sang på Betlehemsmarken like relevant i 2013 som i år 0. I vår tid synes valget å stå mellom sekulærhumanismens uforutsigbare egoisme, islams krav om underkastelse under en a-moralsk monoteistisk guddom og kristendommens invitasjon til en kjærlig relasjon med Treenigheten.  Men alle tre er gjensidig utelukkende, mennesket kan ikke være et tilfeldig resultat av evolusjonen, underkastet Allah og skapt i Treenighetens bilde på en og samme tid. Samfunnet vårt må velge hva vi skal bygge fremtiden på. 

Er det sikkert at kristendommen er det verste alternativet? Kjell Skartveit: https://www.document.no/2013/12/24/julens-budskap-politisk-aktuelt-i-2013/

 

Kilpatrick, på Rel. of pease: Dec 5, 2017 - 6:17 pm EST: Don’t be fooled: Muslims don’t have the same family values as Christians (catholicism , christianity , islam , jihad , mary , muhammad , polygamy , the koran). 

December 5, 2017 (Crisis Magazine) — Just as it’s not a good idea to read too much into the cross tattooed on the bicep of the otherwise threatening biker at the bar, it’s best not to read too much into the occasional concessions toward Christianity we find in Islam.

For some Catholics, it seems to be enough to hear that, as Nostra Aetate tells us, Muslims “revere” Jesus and “honor” Mary. I can’t remember the number of times that some hopeful Catholic has pointed out to me that there’s a whole chapter named after Mary in the Koran, or that Mary is mentioned more than any other women in that book. Supposedly, that somehow compensates for all the verses in the Koran that call for crucifixions, beheadings, and amputations, and for the fact that Christians who live in Muslim lands generally lead a precarious existence.

In the grasping-for-straws department, one of the items most frequently on display is the claim that Muslims have more or less the same moral code that governs traditional Christians. For example, in Nostra Aetate we read not only that Muslims honor Jesus and Mary, but that “they value the moral life.” Likewise, numerous Catholic writers have made the case that Muslims are our natural allies in the culture wars because they oppose abortion, adultery, and pornography, and value modesty and chastity.

To be sure, many Muslims families, especially in the U.S., don’t seem that different from Christian families. They pray regularly, attend weekly services, give to charities, and raise polite children. As a result it’s easy to conclude that Islamic family values and Christian family values are essentially the same. But in reality, there is a world of difference between the two. To get a better picture of Islamic family values, it’s advisable to look at Muslim countries or at those parts of the West that are rapidly falling under Islamic influence.

Take Great Britain. A new UK website designed to help Muslim men find second wives has more than 100,000 users. And it’s estimated that there are already as many as 20,000 polygamous marriages among British Muslims. In addition to polygamy there are many other practices that one would be hard pressed to find in Christian families: tens of thousands of cases of female genital mutilation, forced marriages to first cousins, and women shrouded in burqas. 

But let’s focus on polygamy. It’s not simply an incidental item that happens to be found in Arab cultures, rather it’s a central element in the Islamic system. The practice is completely in accord with sharia law and with the Koran. In the Koran, Muslim men are allowed up to four wives at one time. Muhammad, however, received a special revelation from Allah permitting him to have as many wives as he wanted. Since Muhammad is considered the perfect man, and the model of proper conduct, there is no theological ground for opposing polygamy. Of course, a great many Muslim men don’t practice polygamy, but that’s not because the practice is considered improper, it’s because many men can’t afford to support more than one wife. But it’s always a possibility. The standard Egyptian marriage contract contains spaces for the husband to fill in the names of wives number one, two, and three, just in case.

Christianity introduced a revolution in the relationship between men and women. It erased the inequality between the sexes that practices such as polygamy reinforced. And it raised marriage between one man and one woman to the level of a sacrament. Under the influence of Christianity, polygamy became unlawful in the West and in many other parts of the world as well. On the other hand, the faith that Muhammad introduced retained and reinforced the practice by giving it a religious sanction. Moreover, polygamy is no mere relic of the past. With the modern day resurgence of Islam, the practice is spreading. A Western convert to Islam can be suddenly transported back to a time when a man could rule his household much as a caliph ruled his harem.

Why did Muhammad reject the Christian vision of marriage? A theologian might trace it back to his rejection of the Trinity. Just as the Incarnation elevates our understanding of man, the doctrine of the Trinity elevates our understanding of marriage and family. The shared love between the three persons of the Trinity becomes the model for marriage and family. But there is no such heavenly model in Islam. In Muhammad’s book, Allah is a solitary God and must remain so. Thus:

    So believe in God and His apostles and do not say “three”… God is but one God. God forbid that He should have a Son!” (4: 171).

The Koran provides no theological basis for understanding marriage as a one-man-one-woman proposition. But theology may not have been the deciding factor. Muhammad may also have had personal motives for preferring polygamy to monogamy. It is very possible that he simply did not want to limit himself to one wife. Scholars of Islam designate a number of Muhammad’s revelations as “revelations of convenience”—that is, revelations that worked to his personal advantage or helped him to resolve a family conflict. The revelation that allowed him to marry his own daughter-in-law falls into that category, and so does the revelation that permitted him to have an unlimited number of wives (and sex slaves).

But there is yet a third motive that needs to be considered. As numerous scholars have noted, totalitarian systems look upon the traditional two-parent family as a rival. The fear is that family loyalty may take precedence over the “higher” loyalty that one owes to the state. Tyrants know that the bonds of affection that develop in a family may prove stronger than one’s allegiance to the ruling ideology, or to Big Brother, or to Dear Leader.

This was certainly the case with Nazism. Through organizations such as the Hitler Youth, the Nazis sought to transfer a child’s loyalty from his parents to the state. Likewise, communists looked upon the traditional family as nothing more than a reactionary holdover from the days of bourgeois morality. Communists had no qualms about urging children to act as informants on their parents, and in Stalinist Russia one such informant—thirteen-year-old Pavlik Morozov—was elevated to the status of a national hero. 

As the modern secular state becomes increasingly totalitarian, it also begins to look upon the family as a rival to its aim of achieving complete control over citizens. Thus the state seeks through various means to undermine the purpose of marriage (e.g., by promoting abortions), and to disrupt the relationship between husband and wife (e.g., by making women financially dependent on the state). Meanwhile, the media—which often acts as an agent of the state– can be counted on to extol unorthodox family arrangements. These days, sitcoms about traditional families are as verboten as cigarette commercials. 

It shouldn’t be surprising then that Islam, which is a totalitarian system par excellence, favors the polygamous family structure. Through sharia law, Islam seeks to control every aspect of an individual’s life. As its advocates insist, Islam is not just a religion, it is a complete way of life. Moreover, it’s a purpose-driven life. It’s meant to be lived in service to the ideology of jihad for the sake of Allah. As Nonie Darwish puts it in Wholly Different, “In Islam, after believing in Allah, the number one priority for a Muslim believer is not family; it is jihad.” Consequently, “a man who is devoted to his wife and children in a monogamous marriage is a threat to jihad.” 

Darwish argues that the Christian ideal of exclusive and permanent loyalty between man and wife is at odds with the aims of Islam. Marriage so conceived is a rival to the single-minded pursuit of jihad. But a polygamous marriage is not. For one thing, the husband has no obligation to remain loyal to one wife. Just as important, a polygamous family by its very nature is riven with internal rivalries. It lacks the organic unity which might allow it to stand as a rival to the ideology of jihad.

According to Darwish and other former Muslims, the structure of polygamous families (combined with the knowledge that one’s monogamous marriage can be suddenly transformed into a multiple one) makes for divided loyalties and dysfunctional families. It pits wife against wife, step-brother against step-brother, and mother-in-law, against daughter-in-law.

In addition, Islamic theology creates rivalries between a husband’s current wife/wives and his brides-to-be in paradise. In order to ensure that Muslim men will never be satisfied with their current wife or wives, they are promised more polygamy with more desirable partners in the next world. Of course, the only sure fire way of securing brides in paradise is by committing jihad for the sake of Allah. Thus, as Darwish puts it, “Islam has substituted love of jihad and martyrdom for love of family.”

A recent example of Darwish’s observation is provided by Sayfulla Saipov, the jihadist who killed eight people on a New York City bike path by running them down with a truck. Saipov is a family man, but only in the most limited sense of the term. He has a wife and three children, but he also had jihad on his mind. Unlike the ordinary soldier who hopes to return from the battlefield to rejoin his wife and children, this “soldier of ISIS” was intent on joining his brides in paradise instead. The promise of perfect wives in paradise tends to weaken the ties to one’s family here on earth. Moreover, as Muhammad understood, such a promise is an efficient mechanism for insuring that there will always be an abundant supply of recruits for the jihad. 

Not all Muslims are so minded, of course. They are not interested in polygamy or jihad, and they may have their doubts about the existence of the 72 virgins. Some Muslim marriages, as Darwish readily admits, “are happy and successful.” Some Muslims manage to rise above ideology and to ignore the misogynistic teachings of Islam.

Still, on the whole, Islamic family relation are far more dysfunctional than Western citizens realize. Polygamy is not the only problem. Child marriage is common, and so are forced marriages. In Iran and other Shia Muslim societies, temporary marriage (a form of prostitution) is legal. And 91 percent of all honor violence worldwide is committed by Muslims. 

On that subject, Islamic law states that there is no penalty for a mother or father who kills their child, and no penalty for a grandmother or grandfather who kills their children’s children (Reliance of the Traveller, o1.4). Conversely, a child may kill a parent for the sake of honor. Sons often take part in killing their mothers (or sisters) who have jeopardized family honor in some way or other. In The Stoning of Soraya M.—a film based on a true story—the father and the son of an accused wife and mother are the ones who throw the first stones. In the West Bank, parents deliberately raise their children to become suicide bombers. This also is for the sake of honor, because, as one might expect in a system that revolves around jihad, great honor redounds to the parents of martyrs. 

If the Soviets and the Nazis encouraged children to betray their parents, the Islamic system teaches that any family member may be sacrificed by any other family member for the sake of Allah and the jihad. Child against parent, parent against child, husband against wife, brother against sister, wife against wife: it’s a sinister system. And it should not be compared to the Christian family ideal.

It’s true, of course, that families in Western societies are often troubled and destructive. But in the Christian and post-Christian world, family dysfunction is not a function of Christian values. It’s a departure from them. The troubles that afflict modern families are largely the result of acting out the anti-Christian and anti-family values of the secular society.

Christians are far from perfect. They are not immune to folly or to sin. But Christian family values are no more like Islamic values than they are like Nazi family values or Soviet family values. Catholics who draw a false equivalence between the two decidedly different visions of family life represented by Islam and Christianity ought to know better. And they ought to stop doing it.

https://www.lifesitenews.com/opinion/islamic-family-values

 

Is Jesus God? Is the Holy Spirit a person? Is God triune? ... Is the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity obsolete? Definition of "The Trinity": 

    There is in the Divine Being but one indivisible essence (ousia, essentia).

    In this one Divine Being there are three Persons or individual subsistences (hypostaseis), Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

    The whole undivided essence of God belongs equally to each of the three persons.

    The subsistence and operation of the three persons in the divine Being is marked by a certain definite order.

    There are certain personal attributes by which the three persons are distinguished.

    The Church confesses the Trinity to be a mystery beyond the comprehension of man.

Louis Berkhof (1941) Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman. p. 87-89. 

1 John 5:7: For there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost: and these three are one.

This verse is sometimes used to support the Trinity. It was added to a Latin translation of 1 John sometime after 350 A.D. and first appears in Greek in 1215 A.D. - well over 1,000 years after 1 John was written. This verse is a pious speculation by a copyist, not Scriptural evidence from John himself.

Is God one?

Yes. "Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well:" (James 2:19).

Is Jesus a God-level being?

Yes. "And Thomas answered and said unto him [the risen Christ], My Lord and my God." (John 20:28)

Is Jesus separate from the Almighty God, the Father?

Yes. Jesus cried out from the Cross, when he became sin for us (2 Cor. 5:21), "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (Matt. 27:46). 

Are Jesus and the Father equal as the Athanasian Creed claims?

Another website presents this list:

1 Tim. 2:5 - the [divine] man Christ is mediator between us and God;

John 14:28 - the Father is greater than the Son;

John 20:17 - The Father is God over the Son;

Mark 13:32 - The Father knew something that the Son did not yet know (i.e., the day and hour of the Second Coming);

Matt. 20:20-23 - Deciding who will sit at the side of Jesus is the right of the Father only, not the Son;

John 5:19; 7:16-18, 8:38, 12:49,50, and 15:15 - Christ said He did not teach His own doctrines, but only those that He had heard or seen from the Father.

 

Did Jesus ever cease to exist?

"I am he that liveth, and was dead; and, behold, I am alive for evermore, Amen;" (Rev. 1:18). 

Is the Holy Spirit a person (in the modern sense)?

No. "Now the birth of Jesus Christ ... she was found with child of the Holy Spirit" (Matt. 1:18) - if the Holy Spirit is a person, then the Holy Spirit is the father of Jesus! (This also refutes claims that the Holy Spirit is a created being, like an angel.)

How does the New Testament define the Holy Spirit?

Luke 24:49 "stay here in the city until you have been clothed with power from on high." (NRSV)

2 Timothy 1:7 "For God hath not given us the spirit of fear; but of power, and of love, and of a sound mind."

The Holy Spirit is the presence and power of God, the mind of God, the essence of God. See Knowing God: Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit.

Is the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity obsolete?

Yes. "God in three persons, Blessed Trinity" is an outdated and inaccurate statement of the nature of God.

(a) The meaning of the word "person" has changed.

(b) Our understanding of relationships has changed.

(c) Our understanding of the "substance" of which God is composed has changed.

(d) The divine self-revelation has continued.

(e) The theological problems the Doctrine was intended to solve are no longer of prime concern.

All this is well-understood by theologians, but has not yet permeated down to the broad mass of Christians. Many still feel that "belief in the Trinity" is required - but, when pressed, no one is able to explain the Doctrine! It has been called a "strict mystery" (in "My Catholic Faith") - a hidden truth that is still hidden even after it has been revealed!

 

"The Trinitarian doctrine of the Church is the higher mathematics of theology." Wolfhart Pannenberg, University of Chicago, 3-7-2001: 

Dart's personal Creed on what the Bible means by the Oneness of God:

I believe that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit [and whatever else is yet to be revealed] are all God and are one in the sense that they are united in spirit and in purpose.

Ronald L. Dart, evangelist, 8-22-2002

From the [Roman] Catholic Encyclopedia article on the "Trinity":

There is therefore nothing created, nothing subject to another in the Trinity: nor is there anything that has been added as though it once had not existed, but had entered afterwards: therefore the Father has never been without the Son, nor the Son without the Spirit: and this same Trinity is immutable and unalterable forever.

quoted from Patrologiae Graecae Cursus Completus, X, 986, Jacques-Paul Migne (1800-1875)

History of the Trinity

The Mithraic Trinity in a pine tree

Mithras, the unconquerable sun, and his two torch-bearers, Cautes, sunrise, and Cautopates, sunset, in a 3-branch pine tree form a Mithraic "Trinity". Mithraism thrived in Cappadocia (Turkey) until 300 A.D., then around 350 A.D. the Cappadocian monks defined the "Christian" Trinity.

"Triplicity is a symbol of godhead, and it means that god is the origin of all life." says the ancient Greek author, Plutarch, speaking of the pagan god, Osiris.

The Doctrine of the Trinity is not stated in the Bible, but was composed much later. It has been claimed that "The formal statement, however, is legitimately and necessarily deduced from the Scriptures of the New Testament" (Unger's Bible Dictionary, art. Trinity. Chicago: Moody Press, 1966). The nearest thing there is to a "formal statement" is the Athanasian Creed (which is neither a creed nor composed by St. Athanasius!). It presents a long and obscure argument about the divine nature. Further, the Creed informs us, "One cannot be saved without believing this firmly and faithfully." But its vehemence merely highlights its flimsy substance.

The early Christians came out of the strictly monotheistic world of Judaism into the rampantly polytheistic Roman Empire. The Doctrine of the Trinity, "God in one substance, but in three persona, Gk. hypostaseis" was an attempt to position themselves theologically between these extremes.

Starting from the "Baptismal Formula" of Matt. 28:19, "baptizing them into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit:", Theophilus of Antioch utilized the Greek term trias for three-in-one-ness. This was translated by Tertullian (ca. 200 A.D.) as trinitas, explained as "three persons in one substance". This was adopted as the viewpoint of main-line Christianity at the Council of Nicea (325 A.D.). It was then further developed by the Cappadocian monks (Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa), and formally proclaimed at the Council of Constantinople (381 A.D.). Augustine of Hippo's De Trinitate became its authoritative explanation.

The doctrine of the Trinity was not based on the Bible, but was formulated apart from the Bible. For instance, "Two of the Cappadocians, Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus, admit silently that the Scriptural evidence for the Spirit as a distinct hypostasis within the Godhead is inadequate. Basil in his De Spiritu tries to take refuge in a most unsatisfactory doctrine of secret unscriptural tradition on the subject. Gregory, though he tacitly rejects Basil's device, in effect appeals to the experience and practice of the Church to supplement Scripture at this point." (R.P.C. Hanson, "Studies in Christian Antiquity", Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985, p. 245). 

In the past 1800 years, the Doctrine has been adopted as a requirement of normative Christianity (e.g., in the Lausanne Covenant), but it has also been both elaborated and criticized. Many early protestants rejected it as part of Catholic hocus pocus, but they were unable to formulate a satisfactory alternative.

In recent centuries, the concepts of personhood, self-expression and the rights of individuals have become ever more pronounced in our society. Consequently, the conventional formulation of the Trinity is ever more misleading as an expression of the nature of God, whatever one's theological position on the subject.

What is the Trinity?: Current Doctrines of the Trinity:

There are two main perspectives:

(a) The "Economic" Trinity: God for us, or God in salvation history, an example is 2. below;

(b) The "Immanent" Trinity: God apart from us, an example is 1. below.

1. "God in three persons, blessed Trinity"

"The doctrine of the Trinity says that there is one God who exists eternally as three distinct persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. ... Yet the New Testament also makes the distinction between the Father and the Son as two very different persons. In fact they tell us that they love one another, speak to each other, and seek to glorify each other (e.g., John 17: 1-26). ... Thus, the Holy Spirit is revealed by Christ [John 14-16] to be a third person distinct from the Father and distinct from the Son." CRI Perspective CP0704 - Hank Hanegraaff

"The Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. He is not some vague, ethereal shadow nor an impersonal force. He is equal in every way with the Father and with the Son. All divine attributes are ascribed to the Holy Spirit. He has infinite intellect (1 Cor. 2:11), will (1 Cor. 12:11), and emotion (Romans 15:30)." Bill Bright of Campus Crusade:

"God is one What and three Whos."

But modern Christian theologians say:

"Most recent attempts to express meaningfully the idea of three-in-oneness of God recognize that the traditional terminology is often misleading to modern man. This is particularly true of the translation of the Latin persona as "person". The Latin word did not mean what the English "person" means in common parlance. The latter would suggest three personal divine beings in God, hence tritheism. In contrast to this, the doctrine of the Trinity is intended to affirm, not deny, the oneness of God." (Claude Welch, art. Trinity in "A Handbook of Christian Theology", New York: Living Age Books, 1958.)

2. "The linear Trinity: Father, then Son, then Spirit."

The Trinity represents the revelatory action of God. God's self-revelation began with the Father, continued historically with the Son, but is now performed through the Spirit. Yet the Father remains senior to the Son and the Son to the Spirit. The "other comforter" of John 14:16 essentially replaces Christ in action. Irenaeus and the Cappadocian monks. Sabellius (3rd. Century) espoused a doctrine like this.

    "Oneness", "Jesus Only" parallels "linear" Trinitarianism.

    "This one true God has revealed Himself as Father in creation, through the Son in redemption, and as the Holy Ghost by emanation."

    "This one True God manifested Himself in the Old Testament in divers ways, in the Son while He walked among men; as the Holy Ghost after the ascension."

    Assemblies Of The Lord Jesus Christ: Articles of Faith

3. "The Trinity of the Cross: the Spirit holds the Father and Son together."

During the Crucifixion, Christ experienced the "loneliness of the sinner who has rejected God", but despite this, "the Spirit unites Father and Son while stretching their mutual love to the point of unbearability" (von Balthazar, 1961). Pannenberg.

4. "The relational Trinity"

"Richard of St. Victor argues that perfect love must occur in a relationship of perfect equality (requiring two persons) but also that such a relationship (if perfect) must necessarily be outgoing, overflowing to a least one other as a shared communitarian benefit (and so the 'third' is needed)" (Sarah Coakley, "Why Three", 1993, in S. Coakley & D. Pailin, "The Making and Remaking of Christian Doctrine", Oxford: Clarendon Press).

5. "The incorporating Trinity"

The Father is the originator. The Son is the transformer. The Spirit is the incorporator. "The 'Father' is both source and ultimate object of divine desire; the 'Spirit' is that (irreducibly distinct) enabler and incorporator of that desire in creation - that which makes the creation divine; the 'Son' is that divine and perfected creation." (Sarah Coakley). Origen. Cyril of Jerusalem. John of the Cross.

6. "The Trinity as metaphor for communication"

"The Holy Spirit is just the 'being of God' in the Church" (Schleiermacher). "The Spirit is 'God-in-God's-communication-to-the world'" (Geoffrey Lampe).

7. "The Trinity as divinization of male and female"

"In [Roman Catholic theologian Leonardo] Boff's theology Mary is part of the Trinity, but does not make it into a `Quaternity' because she is identical with the Holy Spirit. Jesus is the divinization of the male, Mary of the female. Mary's union with the divinity is of a hypostatic order." (Stephen Benko, "The Virgin Goddess", Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993). 

8. "The Trinity as modes of God's existence"

"They [the Cappadocians, etc.] developed a doctrine of God as Trinity, as one substance or ousia who existed as three hypostaseis, three distinct realities or entities (I refrain from using the misleading word `Person'), three ways of being or modes of existing as God." (Hanson, p. 244).

"There are three centers of activity within God. The Father creates. The Son obeys and proclaims. The Holy Spirit glorifies." (Cappadocians according to Wolfhart Pannenburg, 3-7-2001)

"The Godhead is 3 states of one thing, like water, ice and steam." (an emailed comment). 

9. "The Trinity as attributes of God's existence"

"In the Father lies the transcendency of God; in the Son, his manifestation; in the Holy Spirit, his immanence - this is the meaning of the Holy Trinity." (Toyohiko Kagawa, 1935). 

10. "The Processional and Return Models of the Trinity"

[Processional model:] "the Father's gift of the Holy Spirit to Jesus, appropriated by Jesus with increasing intensity up to the climactic point of his passion and death, perfectly manifests in time the Father's eternal gift of the Spirit to the Son, [Return model:] fully returned by the Son; this mutual gift of personal love is the very life of the triune God." (David Coffey, summarized by Bruce D. Marshall, 2000.)

"Today, there are no controversies between Christian confessions about the central content of faith concerning the doctrine of the Trinity. It is thus a part of the basic Christian consensus." p. 725 of the Handbook of Catholic Theology, Crossroad, New York, 1985. This is either wishful thinking or because everyone is too confused to argue!

The Shema:

How does the statement "Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God is one LORD:" (Deut. 6:4) relate to Christian theology?

As Paul says, "we see through a glass darkly!"

A useful analogy is to think of a distant star. When Jesus arrived on Earth, He brought a spiritual telescope with Him. When we look through the spiritual telescope we now see that what we thought was one star is a binary star.

The original intent of the Shema was something along the lines "We Jews only worship one God, while you heathen worship lots of gods (depending on the situation)."

Christians also worship one God. Everywhere in the Gospels, Jesus tells us to worship the Father. The Shema does not mean there are no other gods (as I've heard Jewish scholars admit).

In the ancient world there were basically two perspectives:

(a) God is an isolated all-powerful individual - the best modern equivalent is Allah

(b) The Gods are a bunch of arguing, powerful beings - like the Greek Gods on Mt. Olympus.

But modern theologians present a third viewpoint:

(c) God is a cooperating family, of which the Father is the undisputed head. It seems that this was the option that the very early Trinitarians (called Triadists) were trying to express, but they soon got tangled up in theological niceties and ended up with an isolated group of three, rather than a family relationship.

Question: Was the Word the Creator?

The KJV in John 1: "All things were made by him" is misleading. The Greeks says "All things were made by means of him". In other words, "God spoke" and His Word (which carried through on God's intention) was Jesus.

Question: When did Jesus become the "Son"?

References to the "Son" in the OT (e.g., in the Psalms) appear to be prophetic, rather than reporting the then current situation.

The statement "You are my Son, this day I have begotten you." has been assigned to various points of time, for instance, at the announcement to Mary.

Jesus was "declared to be God's Son by the resurrection from the dead." So it seems to be then that Jesus fully became the Father's eternal, spiritual Son.

Is God a "Community"?

There is a movement among modern theologians of many denominations away from the analogy of God as "Trinity" towards that of God as "Community". Here is their trajectory:

Randolph Crump Miller, Empirical Theology: a handbook. Birmingham, Alabama: Religious Education Press, 1992. p.287

"Christians still need to face the question of interpreting such ancient doctrines as the Trinity from an empirical base. Although many people now object to the patriarchal use of 'Father' and 'Son,' these models are part of the tradition and need reinterpretation. We may say that God as Father is the power who is the unchanging source of values; as Father, God is primordial and everlasting, the source of creativity, potentiality, and emerging novelty; it is God's aim to which we should attempt to align ourselves. God as Logos and Sophia is the Word and Wisdom, that mode through which God is revealed to us in experience. The human personality of Jesus was the point at which the Word and Wisdom became a unique ingredient in the world, so that we can say that Jesus' human aim and the aim of God came freely into union. God as Spirit (Ruach) is the indwelling of God as consequent in human nature, giving us both life and hope. This keeps the essential meaning of God as Trinity, for the three aspects of God should be considered as three 'faces' or 'modes' or 'masks.' This is to be understood as an analogy and a model and not as literal truth."

Ingolf U. Dalferth, "Chapter 7. The Eschatalogical Roots of the Doctrine of the Trinity" in "Trinitarian Theology Today", Christoph Schwöbel, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995, p. 167:

"... the trinitarian rule [is] that no general terms are to be used of Father, Son and Spirit. Not even 'person' (or an equivalent term) can be used of them in exactly the same way." [i.e., Father, Son and Holy Spirit are qualitatively different from each other].

"On Communitarian Divinity" by A.O. Ogbonnaya, New York: Paragon House (1994): "It is almost a truism to say that how one conceives and speaks of God affects the way one lives with other human beings" (p. ix). Ogbonnaya perceives three options: monotheism, polytheism and a community of Gods (p. xii). He sees Tertullian arguing for "God as community". "Tertullian never refers to the Trinity as a mystery. In his view, there is nothing mysterious about a god having a child or children" (p. xiii).

Ted Peters, Professor of Systematic Theology, Pacific Lutheran College, with admiring support from Professor Catherine Mowry LaCugna at Notre Dame, writes in "God as Trinity", Louisville Ky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993:

"There is no inherent reason for assuming that the three persons have to be identical or equal in nature. There is no reason to think that trinitarianism must constitute a civil rights movement for the Holy Spirit. The notion of one being in three persons is simply a conceptual device for trying to understand the drama of salvation that is taking place in Jesus Christ. It does not imply that each of three persons is the same in every way." (p. 70).

"The import of Augustine's point here is that the Holy Spirit is itself the relationship between the Father and the Son. The Spirit is not an additional entity that sponsors a relationship as if in itself it were independent of the relationship... Rather, as the communion of love itself, the Spirit - the giving and the binding power of reciprocity in relationship - is itself the presence of God." (p. 67). 

"[Wolfhart] Pannenberg even goes to the extreme of describing the Spirit in terms of a dynamic force field within which the Father and Son become concrete expression of a previously unutterable communion of love." (p.70).

"I press this interpretation as a more adequate explication of the biblical symbols in light of trinitarian thought. The symbol of the Father communicates the sense of the beyond, the eternal and ineffable abyss. The symbol of the Son communicates a sense of the intimate, of Emmanuel, of God subjected to the vicissitudes of ordinary existence just as we are. The Holy Spirit as love binds the two, assuring that we are speaking here of one divine reality, not two. And in the process of binding Father and Son, the Spirit incorporates us. We are incorporated presently through faith. The promise in which we live and hope looks forward to the future, wherein the whole history of nature will be transformed and incorporated into the everlasting Father-Son unity of love." (p. 174).

Isn't that "Father-Son unity of love" what is meant by the symbol "family"? 

"The Holy Spirit will make us one with Christ and, hence, one with God to live everlastingly in the kingdom of God. What is true about the Jesus of the past will become true for us in the future. By the power of the Holy Spirit, we will come to enjoy the relationship with the Father that Jesus enjoys. This is the eschatalogical promise..." (p. 25). 

Doesn't this turn "Trinity" into "Community", and us into potential "gods"? "If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, ..." (John 10:35).

John D. Zizioulas, "Chapter 2. The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution" in "Trinitarian Theology Today", Christoph Schwöbel, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995, p. 55:

"Man, for the [Church] Fathers, is the 'image of God'. ... Living, on the other hand, according to the image of God means living in the way God exists, i.e., as an image of God's personhood, and this would amount to [man] 'becoming God'."

Peters on using the concept of Trinity as a spur for Christian action:

"In sum, the biblical symbol of the kingdom of God is preferable to that of the Trinity when seeking to enlist religious fervor in behalf of social justice and equality. This is the case because the kingdom of God is a primary symbol in which communal justice already inheres. The Trinity, in contrast, is a second order symbol constructed for the purpose of clarifying the relation between three more basic symbols for God at work in salvation. The kingdom of God is a ready-made symbol for exerting social responsibility." (p.186)

So, the symbol of the Divine community is not "the Trinity", but the "Kingdom of God"!

John D. Zizioulas, "Chapter 2. The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution" in "Trinitarian Theology Today", Christoph Schwöbel, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995, p. 60:

"The Trinity is revealed only in the church, i.e., the community through which we become sons of the Father of Jesus Christ. Outside this it remains a stumblingblock and a scandal."

Doesn't that remark remind you of The Emperor's New Clothes? Apparently, only those in the church can "see" the Trinity - so no one inside the church dare admit to blindness.

Theologians! Disown the Trinity! No longer "put a stumblingblock or an occasion to fall in your brother's way" (Rom. 14:13). It is Christ crucified who is the true stumblingblock and scandal (1 Cor. 1:23).

Here is an earlier assessment by John W. Graham (1920) The Faith of a Quaker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 64-5.

    This discussion has left outside the Doctrine of the Trinity in its complete theological form. It is better so. The doctrine of Nicaea may have been a useful thought-form for the time when it arose; it may have crystallized experience and speculation in the best shape then possible - but it is not a living part of contemporary thought; and I doubt the usefulness of the washed out or attenuated forms of the doctrine in which triple manifestations of some kind can be noted or discerned in God. These are really only more polite and less dangerous ways of denying the old conception. This reduced doctrine really darkens counsel, and is to most people unintelligible, though it is doubtless convenient to keep the traditional word, even if you alter its meaning. It has, of course, no more authority than a Roman Emperor [Constantine] and a Church Council [Nicea] under his presidency and control can give it. It was no part of the thought of Jesus nor of Paul.

ABCOG invites readers to react to the suggestion that the Doctrine of the Trinity is obsolete, using the comment form below.

The Holy Spirit and Personhood: 

After reading this, an inquirer asked:

1. Didn't Jesus refer to the Holy Spirit as "he," and "another Comforter"?

2. If the Holy Spirit is not a person, then how could he:

 i. speak to individuals (Acts 8:29;10:19-20;20:28;16:7,9)?

 ii. be lied to (Acts 5:3)?

 iii. or be grieved (Eph. 4:30)?

 iv. or be blashemed against? (Mark 3:29)

 Reply:

You are presenting a strong argument. Indeed, if that was all the Bible had to say, there would never have been any dispute. Here are some thoughts:

Your point 1: Didn't Jesus refer to the Holy Spirit as "he"?

Sorry, Jesus didn't! Jesus spoke Aramaic. In this language, the word "Spirit" is feminine, so Jesus, in conversation, called the Spirit "she"! The New Testament is written in Greek. In this language, the word "Spirit" is neuter, so Jesus in the written New Testament, calls the Spirit "it". Only in Latin is the word "Spirit" masculine, so in the Latin translation, the "Vulgate", Jesus is reported to call the Spirit "he". When translators write "he" for the Spirit in English, they are following the Latin, not the Aramaic which Jesus spoke, nor the Greek in which the NT is written. For examples of how the Spirit is called "she" by early Christians writing in Aramaic see odes.htm

Again your point 1: Jesus referred to the Holy Spirit as "he" and "another Comforter."

 John 14:16-18 "another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever; Even the Spirit of truth; ... I will not leave you comfortless: I will come to you."

In John 14:16, the Greek word for "Comforter" (parakleetos = "Counsellor") is masculine, so the translators use the word "he" to refer to him/it. In v.18, Jesus says "I will come to you." These verses are ambiguous, so cannot be decisive. We must look elsewhere in the Bible. But here are some possibilities for these verses:

(i) The "Comforter" is a separate divine person, "the Spirit of Truth".

(ii) The "Comforter" is the gift of an increase in our own mental/spiritual faculties to provide the guidance that Jesus would do if he was physically present with us.

(iii) The "Comforter" is Jesus appearing to us in a different way. The Greek word for "another", heteros, can mean "another of two of the same kind", instead of the more familiar "another of a different kind." Jesus could be refering to another manifestation of Himself, interacting in a different way with the disciples. In I John 2:1, Jesus is called the "advocate" = parakleetos = "comforter".

(iv) The "Comforter" for each of us is another Spirit-filled Christian. There will always be Christians, filled with the spirit of Christ, able to comfort other Christians.

Your points 2: "be grieved" etc.

Here we come to "personification". We often personify non-people. For instance, "My conscience told me not to do this". "The Law says ...". "The Bible says ...". In the Book of Proverbs, "Wisdom" is repeatedly personified: "Wisdom cries out ...". Abel's blood also "cried out". 

Here are some examples to match yours:

2.i. Can non-persons speak?

"But the righteousness which is of faith speaketh on this wise, Say not in thine heart, Who shall ascend into heaven?" (Rom. 10:6)

"the blood of sprinkling, that speaketh better things than that of Abel." (Heb. 12:24)

2.ii. Can non-persons be lied to?

"your heart be not deceived" (Deut. 11:16, Job 31:9, isa. 44:20, Rom. 16:18, James 1:26) - deception is "believing a lie."

2.iii. Can non-persons be grieved?

"to grieve thine heart" (1 Sam. 2:33)

2.iv. Can non-persons be blasphemed against?

"I have heard all thy blasphemies which thou hast spoken against the mountains of Israel," (Ezek. 35:12)

"This man ceaseth not to speak blasphemous words against this holy place, and the law:" (Acts 6:13)

"..., that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed." (1 Tim. 6:1)

"And he opened his mouth in blasphemy against God, to blaspheme his name, and his tabernacle, and them that dwell in heaven." (Rev. 13:6). 

More important are the problems we get into when we think of the Holy Spirit as a person. That leads to many questions. How can we be "filled" with a person (Luke 1:15, 41, 67; Acts 2:4, 4:8, 31, 9:17, 13:9, 52)? How can a "person" flow through us like "rivers of living water" (John 7:38-9)?

An alert reader emailed:

In questioning the personality of the Holy Spirit you ask: How can we be "filled" with a person (Luke 1:15, 41, 67; Acts 2:4, 4:8, 31, 9:17, 13:9, 52)? Perhaps the same way we are filled with the "person" of Jesus through his body and blood? The Bible states Jesus lives in us. He is a person. So I presume we can be filled with the "person" of the Holy Spirit similarly. Your argument against the Holy Spirit goes against the personality of Jesus.

Excellent! ABCOG encourages thoughtful responses! Let's look at some verses:

Col.1:27 ... which is Christ in you, the hope of glory:

Here's what a pro-Trinitarian Commentary says (obviously not written by us!): "This should be Christ among you. Christ who by His Spirit reigns in the hearts of believers (Rom. 8:10, Eph. 3:17, Gal. 2:20, 2 Cor. 3:17, et al.) is present and active among them" (Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistle to the Colossians.)

Gal.2:20 I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me:

Another pro-Trinitarian source, "The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia" says: "The sanctified life is thus a life of personal fellowship lived out with the Father in the spirit of Christ in loving trust and obedient service. ... So completely is [Paul's] life filled by this fellowship that he can say, "It is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me."

So, in fact, it is not the "person" of Jesus but His spirit that lives in us. These verses are confirming, in different words, that the Spirit is the power and presence of God or Jesus, not a separate person!

What about the "spirit of this world" (1 Cor. 2:12), "spirit of jealousy" (Numbers 5:14), "spirit of burning" (Isa. 4:4) and the "spirit of error" (I John 4:6) - are they also persons?

Another alert reader emailed:

Romans 8:26 causes me to think that Holy Spirit may be third person in the Godhead:

Rom 8:26 Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered.

"groanings which cannot be uttered" means "groanings which cannot be put into words."

This is a verse about communicating with Our Father in Heaven. In ancient times, they thought that the way a message could be passed along was by a living being, such as a human or a carrier-pigeon, though they occasionally used smoke signals and other devices. So this verse seemed to be strong evidence that the Holy Spirit is a living being. In modern times we no longer think this way. We all encounter many messages which "cannot be put into words". Here are some examples: the data stream by which this message reached you, the silent alarm at a Bank, the transponder in the tail of an airplane, the signal from a satellite to a GPS device.

So, in modern terms, Paul is saying that the Spirit acts as a corrective filter and amplifier for our prayers. This is rarely the role of a person in a modern communication system.

It is considerations like this that have caused many theologians to have serious doubts about defining God as a Trinity.

Athanasian Creed: 

Whoever wants to be saved should above all cling to the catholic [worldwide] faith. Whoever does not guard it whole and inviolable will doubtless perish eternally. Now this is the catholic faith:

We worship one God in trinity and the Trinity in unity, neither confusing the persons nor dividing the divine being. For the Father is one person, the Son is another, and the Spirit is still another. But the deity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is one, equal in glory, coeternal in majesty.

What the Father is, the Son is, and so is the Holy Spirit. Uncreated is the Father; uncreated is the Son; uncreated is the Spirit. The Father is infinite; the Son is infinite; the Holy Spirit is infinite. Eternal is the Father; eternal is the Son; eternal is the Spirit:

And yet there are not three eternal beings, but one who is eternal; as there are not three uncreated and unlimited beings, but one who is uncreated and unlimited. Almighty is the Father; almighty is the Son; almighty is the Spirit: And yet there are not three almighty beings, but one who is almighty. Thus the Father is God; the Son is God; the Holy Spirit is God: And yet there are not three gods, but one God. Thus the Father is Lord; the Son is Lord; the Holy Spirit is Lord: And yet there are not three lords, but one Lord. 

As Christian truth compels us to acknowledge each distinct person as God and Lord, so catholic religion forbids us to say that there are three gods or lords.

The Father was neither made nor created nor begotten; the Son was neither made nor created, but was alone begotten of the Father; the Spirit was neither made nor created, but is proceeding from the Father and the Son. Thus there is one Father, not three fathers; one Son, not three sons; one Holy Spirit, not three spirits.

And in this Trinity, no one is before or after, greater or less than the other; but all three persons are in themselves, coeternal and coequal; and so we must worship the Trinity in unity and the one God in three persons. Whoever wants to be saved should think thus about the Trinity.

It is necessary for eternal salvation that one also faithfully believe that our Lord Jesus Christ became flesh. For this is the true faith that we believe and confess: That our Lord Jesus Christ, God's Son, is both God and man. He is God, begotten before all worlds from the being of the Father, and he is man, born in the world from the being of his mother -- existing fully as God, and fully as man with a rational soul and a human body; equal to the Father in divinity, subordinate to the Father in humanity. Although he is God and man, he is not divided, but is one Christ. He is united because God has taken humanity into himself; he does not transform deity into humanity. He is completely one in the unity of his person, without confusing his natures. For as the rational soul and body are one person, so the one Christ is God and man.

He suffered death for our salvation. He descended into hell and rose again from the dead. He ascended into heaven and is seated at the right hand of the Father. He will come again to judge the living and the dead.

At his coming all people shall rise bodily to give an account of their own deeds. Those who have done good will enter eternal life, those who have done evil will enter eternal fire.

This is the catholic faith. One cannot be saved without believing this firmly and faithfully.

Ecumenical Creeds Text prepared by the International Consultation on English Texts (ICET) and the English Language Liturgical Consultation (ELLC). Text arrangement and italics are ABCOG's.

 

Who, what, why is the Holy Spirit? the Trinity? 

        Did Jesus Christ teach "there is only one God"? Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God is one LORD!"

         Are you truly begotten of God? How the Holy Spirit makes us different by George Whitefield, London & America, 1770

        Has the Holy Spirit brought Jesus into your heart as...The Indwelling Christ by Howard O. Jones, Cleveland, Ohio, 1957

        How does God transform us into His sons and daughters? The Christian and the Holy Spirit

        The presences and power of God ... The Holy Spirit in the Old Testament, Luke and Acts by G. W. H. Lampe, Birmingham, England, 1955

        What is the nature of God? The "Trinity" ... fact or fiction?

        Knowing God: The Mystery of the Gods. Is God one individual with three modes of existence? How many Gods are there?

        Knowing God: Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. Is Jesus God? Is the Holy Spirit a person?

        The Trinity: Is Jesus God? Is the Holy Spirit a person? Is God triune?

        A glimpse at what early Christians believed... Early Christian Hymns: The Odes of Solomon

        When did the Trinity become part of "Christian" doctrine?

        "Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost" proves He is a person!?

        "Is Jahve the name of the Father, never used of Jesus?"

        Who is the "Lord" in Paul's Epistles?

Who, what, why is the Holy Spirit? the Trinity?

        Did Jesus Christ teach "there is only one God"? Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God is one LORD!"

        Are you truly begotten of God? How the Holy Spirit makes us different by George Whitefield, London & America, 1770

        Has the Holy Spirit brought Jesus into your heart as...The Indwelling Christ by Howard O. Jones, Cleveland, Ohio, 1957

        How does God transform us into His sons and daughters? The Christian and the Holy Spirit

        The presences and power of God ... The Holy Spirit in the Old Testament, Luke and Acts by G. W. H. Lampe, Birmingham, England, 1955

        What is the nature of God? The "Trinity" ... fact or fiction?

        Knowing God: The Mystery of the Gods. Is God one individual with three modes of existence? How many Gods are there? 

        Knowing God: Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. Is Jesus God? Is the Holy Spirit a person?

        The Trinity: Is Jesus God? Is the Holy Spirit a person? Is God triune?

        A glimpse at what early Christians believed... Early Christian Hymns: The Odes of Solomon

        When did the Trinity become part of "Christian" doctrine?

        "Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost" proves He is a person!?

        "Is Jahve the name of the Father, never used of Jesus?"

        Who is the "Lord" in Paul's Epistles?

ABCOG welcomes your comments:  This URL is www.abcog.org/trinity.htm

 

Timothy A Mahoney;

"Trinity higher than being", Dionysius the Areopagite, Mystical Theology. "The distinction between natures was never abolished in their union", Council of Chalcedon: "Be transformed by the renewal of your nous ...

St Paul Romans 12:2

At the heart of Christianity stand two mysteries: the Trinity and the Incarnation. The question for the metaphysician is this: do these two mysteries manifest some deeper reality or do they themselves comprise the ne plus ultra of metaphysics?1. Since the Incarnation arises (in a sense to be explained) out of the mystery of the Trinity, my focus will be on the Trinity2. I will discuss its metaphysical status first, and then situate the Incarnation and creation within a Trinitarian framework. Finally, I will briefly describe genuine metaphysics as transformative gnosis.

Christian Metaphysics: Trinity, Incarnation and Creation

Let us start with a puzzle. "Trinity higher than any being" writes Dionysius in the Mystical Theology3. This strikes a discordant note because Being is a realm of multiplicity and Beyond-Being is the realm of utter simplicity/unity according to the Platonic tradition in which Dionysius seems to have been schooled. How then can the apparent multiplicity of the Trinity be included in a realm of Beyond-Being? Furthermore, Beyond-Being is the realm of the Absolute; does the Trinity as conceived by Dionysius (and other Christians) actually purport to be the Absolute? What is perhaps surprising is that the paradoxical description of God as one utterly simple ousia (being or substance) of three hypostases (Persons) strengthens rather than weakens the Christian God's claim to be the Absolute, the apex of metaphysics. Obviously this requires an explanation. Let me start with the conceptions of Being and Beyond-Being as these are articulated by Plotinus who is widely acknowledged as bringing the Platonic tradition to fruition.

According to Plotinus one must distinguish the realm of becoming from the realm of true being, the realm of "eternally unchanging being, neither generated nor destroyed" (VI.5.2.6-22)4. The realm of being is the realm of Intellect, not subject to the fractured existence in time or space to which the realm of becoming is subject. Intellect is the entire realm of Forms, i.e., Intelligibles, all co-present to each other in thought, constituting a unified multiplicity of luminous self-knowledge5. But Being-Intellect is still a multiplicity6, and thus cannot be the Absolute: 

For there must be something prior to all things which is simple, and this must be different from all that comes after it, being by itself, not mixed with those that come from it, and yet able to be present in the others in a different way, being truly one, and not something else which is then one. For what is not first is in need of what is prior to it, and what is not simple is in need of those which are simple in it so that it may be from them.

(Ennead V.4.1.5-15)7

Thus Beyond-Beyond is perfect unity without multiplicity; all else, including the perfectly unified multiplicity of Being-Intellect, is logically posterior to Beyond-Being. One should note that this description implies both that Beyond-Being transcends and is prior to all things, and yet is also immanent in all things. Beyond-Being, which Plotinus also calls the One, is "present in others in a different way" because without its presence these others would lack unity and hence lapse into unreality because unity of some sort is a sine quâ non of any reality whatsoever.

Since the One is perfect simplicity, it has no determinate, finite character; it cannot be known. Only the Intelligibles, the self-thinking thoughts of the Intellect, and those things lower on the scale of reality can be objects of thought and speech. Hence the One is both unthinkable and ineffable. Our speech about it uses concepts rooted in things below the One. These concepts are predicated of the One only insofar as the One is the cause of all those things (VI.9.3.49-55). As Plotinus puts it: "But we have it in such a way to speak about it, but not to say it in itself. And we say what it is not; what it is we do not say. So that it is from what is posterior [to it] that we speak about it" (V.3.14)8.

What is remarkable is that this description (insofar as it can be described at all) of Beyond-Being, i.e., the One, applies equally well to the Triune God of Christianity9. Dionysius emphasizes the simplicity of the Triune God. For example, in the Mystical Theology, which I quoted above, Dionysius refers to the Triune God as "the One who is beyond all things" and the "Transcendent One" (I.3. 1000C, 1001A). At the beginning of his Divine Names the Christian God is described as the "inscrutable One," the "principle of unity" described as "a monad or henad, because of its supernatural unity and indivisible unity" (I.1.588B, 589C, 589D). Indeed, in a phrase that echoes late Neoplatonists such as Proclus, Dionysius describes God as a "henad unifying every henad" (I.1.588B). And this God is also the Trinity, "the One, the Superunknowable, the Transcendent, Goodness itself, the Triadic Unity" (I.1.593B). Like Plotinus, Dionysius emphasizes that God is "mind beyond mind, word beyond speech . . . gathered up by no discourse, by no intuition, by no name" (Divine Names, I.1.588B). Indeed, the burden of the Divine Names is to grapple with the same problem that Plotinus tackles in such sections of the Enneads as V.3.14 and VI.9-6: how can we speak about the ineffable, since speak about it we must? "And so it is as the Cause of all and as transcending all, he is rightly nameless and yet has the names of everything that is" in so far as all things proceed from the Cause (Divine Names I.6.596C). We can purify the names of God in so far as we systematically eliminate from them any content that implies a lower level of reality. Thus one can begin by eliminating any content that implies inanimate matter and one can continue the process up to what merely implies the higher domain of concepts and ideas. Nevertheless, the endpoint of this process stills falls short of fully capturing the transcendent divine. 

Dionysius' claims concerning the divine simplicity and ineffability are by no means unique to him; they simply represent sound Christian doctrine. For example, Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae devotes eight articles to the simplicity of God and he concludes, following Augustine in De Trinitae (IV.6.7), that "God is truly and absolutely simple" (I.3.7.). The same conclusion is presented in the four articles devoted to the unity of God, where Aquinas affirms that God is supremely one; indeed, he cites with approval Bernard's claim from De Consider. V, "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds first place" (I.11.4). In Summa Contra Gentiles Book I, Chapter 14 Aquinas begins with the claim "The divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect reaches. Thus we are unable to apprehend it by knowing what it is."10 This position is repeated in the Summa Theologiae in the introduction to Question 3, immediately following the Question on the existence of God: "Now because we cannot know what God is, but rather what he is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how he is not" (I.3). How then does Aquinas explain how we talk about God? Basically he concurs with the Plotinus and Dionysius: terms that apply to the attributes of creatures also apply to God in so far as God is the cause of the attributes in creatures. But Aquinas refines the approach by introducing his famous doctrine of analogy: the names applied to God are neither purely univocal (because of the transcendence of God), nor are they purely equivocal (because in this case all of our talk of God would be simply nonsense). Rather, we must understand terms applied to "God and creatures in an analogous sense, that is according to proportion" (I.13.5). The pivot on which Aquinas' position turns is his recognition that God can cause these attributes in things only if God in some sense has the attributes Himself. Aquinas has already shown that "God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures in so far as God is simply11 and universally perfect (I.4.2, cited in I.13.2). In other words, all the perfections of creatures are possessed by God in a more excellent and higher way (I.13.2). Thus Aquinas wants to understand both the via positiva, the way of affirmation or cataphatic way, and the via negativa, the way of negation or apophatic way, within the context of a via eminentia which does justice to both the cataphatic and apophatic. Even with the recognition of the via eminentia the divine transcendence12 is maintained: in the words of the Fourth Lateran Council: "between Creator and creature no similitude can be expressed without implying an even greater dissimilitude."13

We may conclude that Dionysius felt justified in speaking of Trinity as Beyond Being precisely because the God who is Trinity fits the Platonic description of Beyond-Being as utterly simple, perfect unity which is the primal source of the unity and being of all else. Some confusion on this point may arise because Christians often refer to God as the Supreme Being or as Ipse Esse Subsistens (see, for example, Summa Theologiae I.3.4). This title is above all rooted in the Septuagint rendering of Exodus 3:14 in which God describes Himself to Moses as "I am who am." How can God be both Beyond-Being as well as Supreme Being, Ipse Esse Subsistens? I believe that this is a mere verbal conflict based on two distinct uses of the term "being." As we have seen, the realm of being for Plotinus and the Platonic tradition is the realm of multiplicity. But there is no such implication of multiplicity in the use of the term "being "or "esse" in the description of God as "Supreme Being" or as "Ipse Esse Subsistens." As long as one keeps the various usages straight, one should not be confused.

The reader no doubt has noted that in both of the quotations provided above in which Aquinas argued for the simplicity of God the Trinity was mentioned either implicitly — in his quote from Augustine's De Trinitate — or explicitly — in the quotation from Bernard: "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds first place." Now it is time to deal with the obvious objection that God as Trinity compromises the divine simplicity. Two questions should be considered. First, is the Trinity on the same level of reality as that which has been described as perfectly simple? If the Trinity were an emanation from some perfectly simple reality, then the simplicity of that reality would not be compromised by the Trinity. In this case, the identification of Trinity and Absolute that seems to be made by Christians could simply be regarded as "loose" theological talk that does not adequately account for all the distinctions required by rigorous metaphysics. In this respect, Plotinus appears to be a good example of a rigorous metaphysician when he distinguishes between the realm of the One and the realm of Intellect. Intellect emanates from the One and so is located at a lower level of reality than the One, thus the multiplicity of Intellect does not impugn the simplicity of the One. However, we shall see that Christians insist that the Trinity is at the same level of reality as, and in fact is identical to, that which is perfectly simple14. Thus we must raise the second question: how is it that the Trinity, located at the very highest level of reality, does not compromise the divine simplicity? Let me turn first to the question of whether there is a higher level of reality than the Trinity.

John Zizioulas, Orthodox Metropolitan of Pergamon, in a recent book, Being as Communion, describes a certain position in Christian theology that might support the claim that the Trinity is not strictly speaking the highest level of reality. Metropolitan Zizioulas says the position "would bring us back to the ancient Greek ontology: God first is God (His substance or nature, His being), and then exists as Trinity, that is, as persons" (40)15. He writes: "the significance of this interpretation lies in the assumption that the ontological 'principle' of God is not found in the person but in the substance, that is, in the 'being' itself of God" (40)16.

If such an interpretation were true, then the Trinity would be posterior to the principle that generates it. But, as Zizioulas points out, such an interpretation is inaccurate. Indeed, if the interpretation were true, then we should see statements to the effect that the Godhead generates the Trinity. By contrast, what we see are statements such as this one by Dionysius: "the Father is the originating source of the Godhead [pêgaia theotês; Divine Names II.7.645B]. The twentieth-century Orthodox scholar John Meyendorff makes the same point: "the Father is the cause (aitia) and the 'principle' (archê) of the divine nature."17 Indeed, another Orthodox theologian, Vladimir Lossky, summarizes the tradition in this way: the divinity "is the Trinity and this fact can be deduced from no principle nor explained by any sufficient reason for there are neither principles nor causes anterior to the Trinity."18 Even though Orthodox writers sometimes suggest that the Western Church believes differently19, the Roman Catholic Church does in fact agree with the claims articulated here. In the recently-issued Catechism of the Catholic Church it is reaffirmed that the Father is "the source and origin of the whole divinity" (CCC, 245),20 and that the Father is "the principle without principle" (CCC, 247).21

In sum, Christians explicitly claim that there is no principle higher than the Trinity from which the Trinity is derived. Thus we must turn to the second question: how is it that the Trinity, located at the very highest level of reality, does not compromise the divine simplicity?

Simply put, the Trinity does not compromise the divine simplicity because it does not introduce any composition into the divine. The persons of the Trinity are not parts of the divine; rather each person is the entirety of God. In the words of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215: "Each of the persons is that supreme reality, viz., the divine substance, essence, or nature."22 At the same Council, the principle of the distinction of the persons is clearly enunciated: "It is the Father who generates, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds;" the distinction in the relations of origin implies the distinction in persons23. Catholic and Orthodox agree on both these issues: 1) each person is the entirety of the ousia and 2) the persons are distinguished by their relations. Vladimir Lossky approvingly quotes the great teacher of the Eastern Church, John Damascene (On the Orthodox Faith) "The Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost are one in all respects save those of being unbegotten, of filiation and of procession;" Lossky himself adds "The only characteristics of the hypostases which we can state to be exclusively proper to each, and which is never found in the others, by reason of their consubstantiality, is thus the relation of origin" (Lossky, 54).24

Here is one point on which Christian revelation utterly surpasses Platonism and other views that exclude multiplicity from the Absolute. Plotinus' discussion of emanation suggests that the reason that there are any levels of reality besides the One is that, as the scholastic maxim indicates, "bonum diffusivum sui," "the good diffuses itself."25 Plotinus assumes, perhaps based on his conception of simplicity, that any diffusion of goodness by the ultimate reality, the One, must produce something at a lower level of reality than the One itself so there is a kind of "subordinationist" trinity — One, Nous, Soul — in which each item exists at a lower level of reality than the previous item. Plotinus' assumption is perfectly natural. But it is on this absolutely fundamental point that the Christian understanding diverges sharply from Neoplatonism. The acts of love, the begetting of the Son and the Procession of the Holy Spirit, from the anarchos ("without principle") Father are perfect in a way that Plotinian emanation is not. The Father bestows the utter fullness of the divinity on the Son and the Holy Spirit. As Bonaventure explains:

Unless there were in the highest good from all eternity an active and consubstantial production, and a hypostasis of equal nobility, as is the case with one who produces by way of generation and spiration26 . . . so that there is the loved and the beloved, the generated and the spirated, that is, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, that is to say, unless these were present, there would not be found the highest good here, because it would not be supremely self-diffusive.27

Indeed, the "supremely self-diffusive" is identical to a "diffusing good [which] communicates to another His whole substance and nature. Nor would He be the highest good were He able to be wanting in this, whether in reality or in thought."28 This is why simplicity and multiplicity are necessary for the Absolute. Clearly the Absolute must have the character of simplicity; otherwise it would be a composite the unity of which would be explained by some higher principle. But the Absolute must have multiplicity as well; otherwise it would lack the perfect self-diffusive goodness of which Bonaventure speaks. Indeed, this is why one must say that the whole Trinity is the Absolute rather than just the Father who is the initiating principle of the Trinitarian relations. It is precisely because the Father accomplishes the perfect self-diffusion of goodness by communicating to others "His whole substance and nature" that we cannot accord the status of the Absolute to the Father alone. In so far as the same divine substance and nature is communicated without diminution to the Son and the Holy Spirit, they must be included in the Absolute. Thus simplicity and multiplicity are the mark of the Absolute. In sum, the Christian finds (or should find) other metaphysical views deficient if they identify the "Absolute" as something that in fact falls short of being the highest good precisely in so far as the purported "Absolute" lacks supreme self-diffusive goodness because it cannot communicate its "whole substance and nature." If something alleged to be the Absolute falls short of supreme goodness, then it cannot be the Absolute.

It is a shattering revelation — "revelation" here used in its most robust sense — that Plotinus' assumption, seemingly the most secure of all human beliefs and one hallowed not only by profound thought but also by age-old religious devotion and practice, is false. In this respect,29 the Trinity confounds humanity's natural quest for pure unity so that it is natural that thoughtful people of great faith reject this revelation, and, clinging to the old assumption, wish to relegate the Trinity to some level of reality beneath the ultimate.30 Since the Trinity utterly surpasses the most deep-seated human presupposition, it is clear that there are no arguments that compel a person to affirm it, even the argument based on perfect self-diffusive goodness just provided. From this it follows that one can, quite "reasonably," opt to reject the Trinity. Thus from an epistemological standpoint the affirmation of the Trinity functions as a first principle, not deducible from any other principles. But unlike some other first principles — the principle of non-contradiction, for example — the Trinity cannot be affirmed without the direct assistance of the Divine, that is, without the assistance of supernatural grace.31 Yet, others claim that some competing notion of the Absolute is delivered to humans by the divine.32 We thus arrive at an epistemological impasse that seems irresolvable except by the direct action of the divine to whom each of the competing sides in the dispute looks for the validation of its claim. A Christian can but sketch the beauty of the vision of the whole that is only visible in the light of the Trinity and hope and pray that this might be the occasion of illuminating grace in the heart.

Unfortunately, many Christians do not appreciate the gift of the revelation of the Trinity. Christian laymen often seem to engage in the many ritual gestures devoted to the Trinity with little understanding of the centrality of the Trinity to the faith. Clergy in the West are famous for being befuddled when it comes to preaching the sermon on Trinity Sunday. Indeed, the prominent twentieth-century Catholic theologian Karl Rahner could lament the absence of the Trinity in the intellectual and devotional life of the modern Church.33 Although recent history demonstrates a new found interest in the Trinity, it still seem that most Christians do not recognize or have somehow forgotten that the doctrine of the Trinity contains34 the "pearl of great price" the ne plus ultra of metaphysical wisdom.

There have been and continue to be grave misunderstandings that arise because of the language in which Trinitarian belief is formulated. For example, in the ancient world the term "prosopon" which means "person" and is thus applied to the Persons of the Trinity, also means "mask" or "appearance."35 These latter meanings tend to suggest "modalism," i.e., the notion that the persons of the Trinity are merely different manifestations of some deeper underlying reality. Modalism is incompatible with the view of the Trinity sketched above. In addition, the formulation of the Creed in the original Greek contrasts the one ousia with the three hypostases. Unfortunately, since the terms "ousia" and "hypostasis" were in most contexts virtual synonyms, this formulation sounded like an outright contradiction. It is only with refined explanations of the terms, particularly by the Cappadocian Fathers, that the proper contrast becomes clear.36 Finally, in the contemporary post-Cartesian/Lockean world, the term "person" tends to suggest a unique center of self-consciousness inaccessible to others. Such a use of "person" is quite opposed to the meaning of the term "Person "as applied to the Trinity.37

These problems in finding the proper language with which to express the Christian understanding of the Trinity should not at all be surprising. Indeed, new language, new "terms of art," had to be forged because they are to be used to describe that which is literally and quite strictly incomprehensible. As the Orthodox thinker Lossky writes: "Greek patristic thought, and particularly that of the Cappadocians, presupposed . . . that God's being and, consequently, the ultimate meaning of hypostatic relations were understood to be totally above comprehension, definition, or argument."38 On the Catholic side, the First Vatican Council (1869-70) calls the Trinity one of the mysteria stricte dicta, "mysteries in the strict sense," that is, realities the content of which is not graspable even after they have been revealed.39 In other words, Christians maintain a strict apophaticism when it comes to the Trinity. It is not that the understanding of the Trinity cannot be formulated without falling into contradiction. In fact, the traditional expression "one God, three persons" does avoid formal contradiction since the expression does not affirm that the very same thing bears contradictory predicates in the very same respect. That is, Christians do not claim "One God is Three Gods," or "One Person is Three Persons." Rather Christians claim God is one in one respect and three in a different respect. Nonetheless, although formal contradiction is avoided, we cannot understand how what is expressed can be true. In other words, the Trinity does not so much violate logic as it transcends logic. In both our experience and natural conceptual schemes if there are three persons, then there are three beings, three instances of the same nature. Likewise, if there is one being, then there cannot be more than one person. The Trinity fractures these categories of thought in irremediable ways. Indeed, Trinitarian apophaticism goes beyond the point at which the trajectory of the human ascent toward the Absolute ends. This natural trajectory incorporates two strategies of apophaticism: 1) deny that any predicates apply to the Absolute at all; 2) affirm that every and all predicates apply to the Absolute so that in the Absolute there is the "coincidence of opposites" to use the phrase favored by the late medieval Cardinal, Nicholas de Cusa, one of the most prominent Western practitioners of this approach.40 Both have the same effect of undoing and undermining the application of language to God in any normal sense. I by no means wish to dismiss these ways of apophaticism. I merely wish to point out that the Trinity does not simply obliterate either implicitly or explicitly all distinctions as these two modes do; rather the doctrine of the Trinity locates with surgical precision the central metaphysical antinomy of the Absolute: the Absolute is "both monad and triad."41 The affirmation that the Absolute is a monad affirms the standard apophaticism; the affirmation that the Absolute is Triad outstrips the standard apophaticism. It is this very specificity that distinguishes the Christian claim. One might urge that such specificity is the mark of metaphysical relativity42 because one cannot accept any apophaticism that does not reduce to one of the two modes mentioned above. One who makes such a claim ignores that fact that Trinitarian apophaticism includes these two modes (Dionysius and Cusa have demonstrated this) insofar as Trinitarian doctrine includes the notion that the ousia of the divine is indivisibly one, a monad, so that the divine ousia transcends all predicates that might be applied to it, and also, as the source of all created things, the divine ousia contains the coincidence of the opposites that exclude one another in creatures.43 But Trinitarian apophaticism includes a further, deeper dimension: this self-same ousia is also Three. As Meyendorff writes in connection with Greek Patristic thought:

The very notion of God's being both Unity and Trinity was a revelation illustrating this incomprehensibility; for no reality, accessible to the mind, could be both 'one' and 'three.' As Vladimir Lossky puts it: 'the Incomprehensible reveals Himself in the very fact of His being incomprehensible, for His Incomprehensibility is rooted in the fact that God is not only Nature but also Three Persons.'44

This further dimension implies that love, otherness, receptivity, communion and consummation are within the highest level of reality, the Absolute itself. Perfect love explains why the Monad is also a Triad, for it is the perfect self-diffusing goodness of the love of the Father that explains the generation and procession of the Son and the Spirit. The three Persons — each distinct in His personhood and thus other than the two remaining Persons — are the Absolute. Two of the Persons receive the fullness of divine ousia from the other, and the Three Persons interpenetrate one another in perfect communion (circumincessio or perichoresis)45 in the divine substance and thus consummate their mutual love. In so far as these are the characteristics of the Absolute, the source of all being, they will also be inscribed in some manner on all being. 

Christ, the Incarnate God, is the point of creation. I hope to show that this is a metaphysical claim rather than merely a statement of simple piety46. First, I address the question of whether the doctrine of the Incarnation is coherent. If it entails outright contradiction, it can be set aside as pious, but muddled, thinking.

As noted above, the doctrine of the Trinity claims that there are three divine Persons or hypostases, and one undivided divine nature through which each of the hypostases is God. There is only one God because the divine nature is utterly simple, unlike the two numerically distinct instances of human nature associated with any two human persons. If each divine hypostasis were simply identical to the divine nature, there would not be three hypostases, but only one; thus, a hypostasis is not simply identical to the divine nature47. This is key because it entails that the Son is not simply identical to the divine nature, so that it is logically possible for the Son to assume a human nature as well. If the Son were simply identical to the divine nature, then it would be impossible for the Son to assume a human nature because the attributes of the Son would in fact be incompatible with the attributes of human nature, e.g., omniscience versus limited knowing. That is, the attributes of the Son would simply be the attributes of the divine nature and such attributes are incompatible with the attributes of human nature.

The Son receives the divine nature from the Father and assumes human nature, but the Son is not simply identical with either of these natures. What is incoherent is that the two natures become one nature: this is why monophysitism is incoherent and why the Chalcedonian language that says the natures are "without confusion" is necessary. We can attribute omniscience, absolute power, etc. to the Son in virtue of the Son's divine nature; we can attribute limited knowing, limited power, etc. to the Son in virtue of His human nature. Because we do not attribute incompatible attributes to the Son in the very same respect, there is no contradiction.

Although there is no contradiction, this does not mean that we can comprehend the truth articulated in the doctrine. The Incarnation is similar to the Trinity in so far as neither one entails a contradiction, but neither one is entirely comprehensible either. The Incarnation demands that a divine Person be not simply identical to a specific instance of a nature, and it also demands attributing two natures to the very same divine Person. By contrast, in the case of creatures each person is a numerically distinct instance of a nature, and no person has more than one nature48. As in the case of the Trinity, the Incarnation does not imply an outright contradiction, but it does fracture the human conceptual scheme. Thus the Incarnation cannot be set aside simply as muddled thought.

Let me turn now to creation. Once again, I shall employ Plotinus' Neoplatonic system to provide a contrast with the Christian view. There are three particular contrasts I wish to draw.

Plotinus explains the existence of all below the One as the result of the self-diffusiveness goodness of the One, which we discussed above. Is this production necessary? Scholars sometimes contrast the necessary production of the One with the free creation of the Christian God. Certainly, the creation of the Christian God is free, indeed gratuitous. The problem is that the contrast does not adequately reflect Plotinus' own analysis. First, the One does not in any sense need anything else for its own fulfillment49. Second, Plotinus argues that that both necessity and freedom are really only applicable to lower level of realities, so that the production of the One is beyond freedom and necessity50. Nonetheless, there is at least one important difference. If the Plotinian One is to engage in an act of self-diffusive goodness, it must "create," i.e., produce something at a lower level of reality than itself. By contrast, the self-diffusive goodness stemming from the Father results in two Persons with at the same level of reality as the Father. The perfect self-diffusive goodness of the Father renders other less perfect acts of diffusing goodness superfluous. In this respect, creation is necessary for the One, but unnecessary for the Christian God. It is fitting that the God of love creates, but it is utterly unnecessary since love is already perfected in the Trinity.

A second contrast is primarily eschatological, but bears on the purpose of creation as well. According to Plotinus a human being can rise through the various levels of being to attain union with the One51. What seems clear is that the lowest level of the hierarchy of being, the material world, is eternally distanced from its source, the One. Of course, the One must be present in some sense for the material world to exist at all. But the material world forever remains the outpost of reality, merely one step away from utter non-being, and a kind of locale of evil52. Christian eschatology presents a strikingly dissimilar picture. The entire material world is to be transformed and taken into the life of the Triune God53. The distance between God and His most remote creation is bridged. This brings us back to the very purpose of creation. Christianity claims that the creation is for the sake of intimate union with the Creator; the world is not simply the product of self-diffusive goodness. This difference reflects the fact that genuine otherness, which implies multiplicity, is seen as inimical to the Absolute by Plotinus, whereas Christians recognize that otherness is woven into the very fabric of the Absolute. The perfect self-diffusive goodness of the Father implies both otherness and intimate union within the Absolute. Indeed, the intra-Trinitarian processions reflect the basic pattern of "generation for the sake of union," and creation repeats this same pattern in an analogous way.

A third point is closely related to the second. Plotinus famously speaks of the flight of the "Alone to the Alone" (VI.9.11). Does this imply that personal identity is lost upon entering union with the One? It is not entirely clear because Plotinus' description of union is so compact54. There is no such unclarity in the Christian description of union with God55: an individual's "participation in the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4) implies that individual identity is retained. Indeed, when creatures enter into the life of the Trinity, they also enter into the life of all other creatures in union with the divine. The result is a sort of perichoresis of creature with creature as well as creature with Creator. There is no absorption, and hence dissolution of the integrity of the creature. The otherness of the Persons within the Trinitarian life guarantees the integrity of creatures within the same Trinitarian life56. 

Each of these three points is reflected in, or perhaps better, flows from, an understanding of Christ, the Alpha and the Omega (Revelation 22:13). Of course, Christ as the eternal Logos is He through whom all things were made (John 1:1)57, but the very purpose of creation is Christ, the anointed one who is the Incarnate God. Again, the purpose of creation is not simply to diffuse goodness by generating things that are good; creatures receive existence so that they may later receive the divine life thereby consummating the relationship between Creator and creation by entering into the perichoretic life of Trinitarian love. Christ, the Incarnate God not only effects this goal, He is this goal in his dual nature. Thus Christ as eternal Logos with the rest of the Trinity generates creation for the sake of His own union with creation so that by this union He may bring all things into the very life of the divine Trinity that He already enjoys.

In the Catholic perspective of the filioque Christ is the uniquely suited member of the Trinity to become Incarnate and act as "the sole mediator between God and man" (1 Timothy 2:5). For the Logos, the eternal Son, receives the divine nature from the Father in a way that is analogous58 to the way in which a creature receives existence from God. Furthermore, as empowered by the Father, the Son with the Father spirates the Holy Spirit59 in a way that is analogous to the way in which it is through the action of the Incarnate Son that divinization is bestowed on creatures.

Let me now revisit the three points made above, but from an explicitly Christological perspective.

First, as we have seen there was no need to create by the Triune God. The perfect acts of self-diffusive goodness in the begetting of the Son and the procession of the Spirit make creation superfluous, an act of sheer beneficence. The process by which God chooses to effect the union of creator and creation is also sheer beneficence, but fitting. Presumably God could have effected union in innumerable ways, but to do so through the Incarnation and ensuing actions of the Son is peculiarly fitting.60 From a Trinitarian perspective, the Son is the Logos, the perfect self-expression of the Father61, so that it is fitting that the process by which creatures are divinized involves the most perfect possible self-expression of the Logos in time. From another perspective, one might say that since the good communicates itself, it is fitting that the highest good communicate itself within the bounds of space and time in the most perfect manner62. The Son, intimately united with the other Persons of the Trinity, has chosen to become human and thus unite Himself to creation in intimate union as the very means by which divinization, our intimate union with God, is effected63. Indeed, in his own life the God-Man recapitulates the entire history of the divine-human interaction especially as this is centered on the Chosen People64. Christ re-enacts and sets aright the missteps of Adam and his offspring, entering into the deepest consequences of human sin in a solidarity with sinners, thereby redeeming them and all creation. This intimate act of union effects the intimate union of God and creatures. 

The second point was that the entire creation, including the material world, is intended to be taken into the life of God. This eschatology is foreshadowed by Christ's Resurrection and Ascension. Christ is not merely raised from the dead in some purely spiritual way; rather his material body arises as well, fulfilling its eschatological potentialities65. And it is of great importance that His resurrected Body is assumed into heaven, not left behind. The point is that the Resurrection is not simply a manifestation of God's power over the material world: the material world itself, as epitomized by the body of Christ, is itself to be taken into the intimacy of the divine life forever. And Christ's intimacy with the material world continues in the world in the Church, the Body of Christ, and its use of material object in its sacraments and sacramentals.

Finally the third point was that individual identity is retained in divine union, for divine union is a perichoresis of creatures with the divine Persons and other creature within the life of the Trinity. This perichoresis is prefigured in the dual nature of Christ66. Human nature has been assumed by the Second Person of the Trinity so that creation itself may be assumed into the life of the Triune God67. It is essential to Christian doctrine that in Christ "human nature was assumed, not absorbed."68 Or in the words of the Council of Chalcedon: "the distinction between the natures was never abolished in their union, but rather the character proper to each of the two natures was preserved as they came together in one person and one hypostasis."69 So too the individual creature is neither absorbed nor annihilated, but rather assumed into the life of the Trinity. 

All the above can be summed up this way. The Triune God, revealed only through the Incarnation, is the Truth of Absolute reality. The Incarnate God, who can be understood only within the Trinitarian ambit, is the Truth of created reality. 

It is not enough to speak or think these two Truths; they must be assimilated into the depths of one's being. Metaphysics is not primarily a set of propositions about ultimate reality. It is primarily transforming gnosis, the kind of knowledge that St. Peter says leads to partaking in the divine nature:

His divine power has granted to us all things that pertain to life and godliness, through the knowledge (epignôseôs) of him who called us to his own glory and excellence, by which he has granted to us his precious and very great promises, that through these you may escape from the corruption of the world because of passion, and become partakers of the divine nature. (2 Peter 1:3-4)70.

It is through this grace-induced gnosis that you are "transformed by the renewal of your mind (nous), that you may prove what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect" (Romans 12:2). This describes metaphysical gnosis penetrating "the eye of the heart" (the felicitous rendering of "nous" by the translators of the Philokalia71; "nous" is rendered in the quoted passage as "mind"), and this means having "the mind [nous] of Christ" (1 Corinthians 2:16). All aspects of one's being are transformed so that one can now wholeheartedly say with Christ "Fiat voluntas tua." Thus, genuine metaphysical knowledge implies that one has already begun to participate in the divine Triune life, the goal of creation72. 

 

Notes

 

1 - Not infrequently, Christians have excluded truths of revelation such as the Trinity ("a mystery that is inaccessible to reason alone," Catechism of the Catholic Church [hereafter abbreviated "CCC"] 237; "237" refers to the section number) from metaphysics, which they restricted to include only those truths that can be know by unassisted natural reason. Two quite recent examples of this are Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985) and W. Norris Clarke, The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001). By contrast I make no such restriction on the content of metaphysics. Indeed, to exclude the Trinity from metaphysics is in some important sense to falsify reality from the beginning. back

 

2 - "The mystery of the Trinity is the central mystery of Christian faith and life" (CCC,234). back

 

3 - Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem, trs. (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1988). All quotations from Dionysius are from this work. back

 

4 - Plotinian references are to the Enneads. The translations I use are those of Dominic J. O'Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). One might also wish to consult A.H. Armstrong, Plotinus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966-88). back

 

5 - VI.4-5. back

 

6 - See arguments in V.3.10, V.4, V.6, and VB.4.2; see also O'Meara, 49-53. back

 

7 - O'Meara, 45. back

 

8 - O'Meara, 57. back

 

9 - In fact, the same sorts of argument that Plotinus employs for the complete unity and simplicity of the primal reality are also employed by Christian writers, e.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.3.7 (Part One, Question 7, Article 7). I reference the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981. back

 

10 - Quoted in Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 40.back

 

11 - Aquinas refutes the argument that the attribution of various perfection to God compromises the divine simplicity by arguing that "things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity" (1.4.2.Reply 1). back

 

12 - God is "the inexpressible, the incomprehensible, the invisible, the ungraspable" according to the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom; quoted in CCC, 42. back

 

13 - Quotation from CCC, 43. back

 

14 - This is not to say that there are no Christians who affirm that there is a level of reality deeper than the Trinity. For example, Meister Eckhart might have suggested that there is a Godhead beyond the Trinity. But the interpretation of Eckhart is very challenging. One might wish to consult the Introduction by Edmund Colledge, O.S.A and Bernard McGinn to Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1981). This text contains the Papal condemnation of some of Eckhart's writings. One should also consult Bernard McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2001). back

 

15 - John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985). back

 

16 - Indeed, Zizioulas claims that such an interpretation prevailed in Western theology. Zizioulas sees this as manifested especially in Westerners dogmatic treatises that followed a pattern of first presenting a treatise "On the One God," which was followed by a treatise "On the Trinity" (40). Zizioulas exaggerates, but clearly makes an important point, as the Western theologian Karl Rahner concedes; see Rahner's The Trinity (London: Burns & Oates, 1969). back

 

17 - John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: historical trends & doctrinal themes (New York: Fordham University Press, rep. 1983), 183. back

 

18 - Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY, St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1976), 47. back

 

19 - See n.17 above. back

 

20 - The CCC here is quoting the Council of Toledo VI held in 638. back

 

21 - The CCC is quoting the Council of Florence held in 1442. back

 

22 - Quoted in the CCC, 253. Gregory Nazianzus in his Oratio 40, 41 writes: "Each person considered in himself is entirely God" (quoted in the CCC, 256). back

 

23 - Quoted in CCC 254. back

 

24 - Of course, the Latin Church and the Greek Church divide over the question of the filioque, the claim that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (filioque in Latin). The filioque entails that the begetting of the Son (from the Father alone) cannot be the same relation as the procession of the Spirit (from the Father and the Son). Without the filioque, the Orthodox claim that the relation of begetting and procession are distinct, but unanalyzed, relations. back

 

25 - See R.T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London: Duckworth, 1972), 63; also see O'Meara's discussion of V.4 and V.1, 60-65. For a general discussion of the notion see Norman Kretzmann, "A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?" in Scott MacDonald, ed., Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 202-228. back

 

26 - "Generation" refers to the begetting of the Son, "spiration" to the procession of the Holy Spirit. back

 

27 - Chapter Six, "The Consideration of the Most Blessed Trinity in Its Name which is The Good," The Journey of the Mind to God, tr. by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., editor, with notes by Stephen F. Brown (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 33. back

 

28 - Ibid., 33. back

 

29 - Though clearly not in all respects, since the Being of the Trinity remains utterly simple as we saw above. back

 

30 - For example, see Frithjof Schuon, Logic and Transcenedence (New York: Harper Row, 1975), 96-109. back

 

31 - CCC, 153. back

 

32 - For example, see Frithjof Schuon, Survey of Metaphysics and Esoterism (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom Books, 1986), especially the first two chapters. back

 

33 - Karl Rahner, The Trinity (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970), 11. back

 

34 - I say "contains" rather than "is" because I wish to distinguish between mere notional knowledge and genuine sapiential knowledge of the Trinity. Sapiential comes from sapience, "taste" as in "Taste and see the Lord is good" (Psalm 34:8). Sapiential knowledge is transformative, as I shall explain below. back

 

35 - Meyendorff, 182. back

 

36 - See Catherine La Cugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), Chapter Two, "Cappadocian Theology," 53-80. back

 

37 - See Rahner "The Problem of the Concept of 'Person'" in Trinity, 103 ff. back

 

38 - Meyendorf, 184-5. back

 

39 - "Mystery of Faith," in Wolfgang Beinert and Francis Schüssler Firoenza, eds., Handbook of Catholic Theology (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1995), 495-6. back

 

40 - See the introduction by H. Lawrence Bond to Nicholas of Cusa: Selected Spiritual Writings (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1997). back

 

41 - "God is identically monad and triad" according to Maximus the Confessor Capita theol. et oecon. II.1, quoted by Meyendorff, 184. back

 

42 - See for example, Frithjof Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions (Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Publishing House, 1993), 133. back

 

43 - See the Aquinas' quotation in note 12. back

 

44 - Meyendorff, 185; quoting Lossky, 64. back

 

45 - See LaCugna, 270-2. back

 

46 - The lack of space forces me to concentrate on what is most essential. Thus I will omit discussion of such important topics as sin and evil. Some creatures are endowed with a finite freedom that reflects the infinite freedom of the Creator. The abuse of finite freedom originates sin and evil. Christ redeems creation from sin and evil, but does more: through Christ creatures participates in the divine nature. back

 

47 - Since the Father is the very principle by whom the other hypostases receive the divine nature, the relation (for lack of a better term) between the Father and the divine nature is different in some way than the relation between the divine nature and the other two hypostases. back

 

48 - To be clear: although Christ has a human nature, his Person is not human, but divine, the Second Person of the Trinity. back

 

49 - See O'Meara, 57. back

 

50 - VI.8.8; see O'Meara, 55-6. back

 

51 - See "The Return of Soul: Philosophy and Mysticism" in O'Meara, 101-110, and "Levels of the Self" in Pierre Hadot, tr. Michael Chase, Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 23-34. Hadot, perhaps the greatest French Plotinian scholar of recent times, provides a very sensitive and sympathetic portrait of Plotinus' spirituality. back

 

52 - Plotinus describes matter as "evil itself" (I.8.8, I.8.13), but this clearly is not his final opinion on the status of matter since even matter is derived from the One. See Denis O'Brien, "Plotinus on matter and evil," in Lloyd P. Gerson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 171-195. back

 

53 - See Ephesians 1:10,1 Corinthians 15:27-8, and John 17:21-23. "The ultimate end of the whole divine economy is the entry of God's creatures into the perfect unity of the Blessed Trinity" (CCC, 260). back

 

54 - See O'Meara, 105-6. back

 

55 - This is often referred to as theosis in the Orthodox tradition. back

 

56 - It should be clear that the Christian conception of the individual as intrinsically oriented toward receptivity to God and other creatures is antithetical to modern atomistic individualism. back

 

57 - Properly speaking creation and redemption are the work of the entire Trinity, but each Person performs the common work through a personal property (CCC, 257-8). back

 

58 - Very remotely in the sense that Lateran IV which was quoted above, states that there is always greater dissimilitude than similitude between Creator and creatures. back

 

59 - The Orthodox do not generally agree with the filioque. Some Orthodox may find the formulation of "by the Father through the Son" as a more palatable interpretation of the filioque. back

 

60 - See Aquinas' Summa Theologiae III.1.2. back

 

61 - "He who has seen me has seen the Father" (John14: 8-9). back

 

62 - Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae III.1.1. back

 

63 - Furthermore, as an act of intimacy with his creation, the tools Christ uses in his salvific work are the created things themselves, things that are endowed by their very nature with symbolic value. Many of the symbols and rituals of Christianity are shared with other great religions because these symbols and rituals are particularly potent natural expressions of what transcends them. The sacramental use of material things is thus a sort of fulfillment of material nature's orientation toward and expression of its divine source. On this, see Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World (Crestwood, NY: St. Valdimir's Seminary Press, 1998). back

 

64 - See Irenaeus Adv. haeres., cited by the CCC, 518. Also see Paul M. Quay The Mystery Hidden for Ages in God (New York: Peter Lang, 1997). back

 

65 - The Transfiguration is itself an anticipation of the Resurrection and eschatological fulfillment of the material creation. back

 

66 - In fact, "the term perichoresis was first used in a Christological context, probably by Gregory Nazianzus [see Ep.101], to stress the mutual interdependence of the two natures of Christ" LaCugna, 272. back

 

67 - "For the Son of God became man so that we might become God" as Athanasius famously put it (De. Inc., 54, 3) quoted CCC, 460. back

 

68 - Gaudium et Spes22§2 (a document of Vatican II). back

 

69 - Council of Chalcedon: DS 302. Quoted in CCC, 467.

 

70 - Revised Standard Version. back

 

71 - Philokalia Volume I, trs. G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware (London: Faber and Faber, 1979), see the entry under "Intellect" in the Glossary, 362. The New Testament uses the form noos; I have used the more common form nous. back

 

72 - See CCC, 460. back

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